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Abstract: 
This thesis examines the utilization of social media platforms (particularly Facebook & Twitter) 
by political actors, contemporary media, and ordinary people to disseminate false or misleading 
information.  Furthermore, it examines how social media have aided in the mobilization of 
previously unpopular extremist social/political movements in the US.  This research provides a 
rich historical account of news media and its dissemination technology.  Additionally, the thesis 
looks to several theories to show that these events are best understood as examples of larger 
processes endemic to modern capitalist societies. Utilizing news media and archival records to 
create event catalogs, this research illustrates how fake news spreads though social media using 
three distinct events, the birther conspiracy, the pizzagate conspiracy, and a Russian attempt to 
sow discord in US politics.  Finally, this research shows how several virtual “imagined 
communities” utilized social media to mobilize physically in one of the largest white nationalist 
rallies in recent memory.  In contrast to similar works, this thesis demonstrates how social media 
in conjunction with alternative media have created competing knowledges defined by political 
discourses that now routinely conflict in profound ways. 
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to explain the relationship between social media and fake news1, as well 
as social media’s role in reshaping American politics.  This thesis engages social media and the 
news shared on it as a major contributor to extreme political beliefs2. The thesis explains how the 
echo chambers of social media politically polarize users while isolating them from dissenting 
ideas.  It then looks to a variety of cases where social media has had a direct role in influencing 
extreme events in the physical world.  The first set of cases illustrate the bridge between social 
media and the physical world by showing the profound real-world effects of false stories and 
social media’s role in disseminating these stories.  In addition to these cases, the thesis also 
analyzes the role of social media on the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville Virginia during 
August 2017.  The analysis of these cases answer the following questions: 
• How are social media utilized by political actors, contemporary media, and ordinary 
people to disseminate false or misleading information? 
• How have social media aided in the mobilization of previously unpopular extremist 
social/political movements in the US? 
These questions examine two concurrent phenomena that may have drastically altered the US 
political climate in recent years.  The thesis will argue that these phenomena – dissemination of 
fake news and the mobilization of extreme political movements in the US – have become 
                                                
1 False news stories created and distributed online.  These articles are produced for many reasons 
varying from satire to political manipulation.  The phrase is also used by people — notably 
Donald Trump –  as a derogatory term for news outlets and stories that the reader disagrees with 
or dislikes. 
2 All references to extremism, extreme political beliefs, and the extreme right, refer specifically 
and exclusively to people and groups that advance beliefs of racial superiority or bigotry against 
people of any race, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, etc. In US political discourse 
these beliefs are typically endemic to the extreme right end of the political spectrum. 
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interrelated.  Therefore, the author will argue that the spread of fake news is associated with the 
spread of alt-right discourses and mobilizations after 2015. 
This thesis begins with a historical analysis of the standard of objectivity in news media, 
government and professional regulatory practices, the creation of the “post-truth” era, and the 
ubiquity of social media.  It then tackles several relevant existing theories on media, 
neoliberalism, and social movements.  This thesis utilizes event catalogs (Tilly 2002) to analyze 
a set of cases for emergent themes.  These themes are then synthesized with existing theory to 
create theories that best answer these questions.  Finally, the thesis concludes with a discussion 
of solutions created by the polarizing and mobilizing effects of the current social media climate. 
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Section 1: Literature and Historical Review 
Historical Section  
 To understand how current media allow political and social actors to distort facts and 
mobilize people, one must examine the history of news media and the various technologies they 
utilize.  This section details the shifts in US news media standards and norms, the shifts in media 
regulation by the FCC, and the advancement of various technologies used to disseminate 
contemporary news media.  For some time, news, technology, and regulation followed a 
concurrent progression until regulation and news standards had begun to wane. 
The History of Standards of Objectivity in the News 
Despite being something that most modern Americans take for granted, the concept and 
practice of objectivity in news is relatively new.   The modern objective news exists as a result of 
three things, the cheap mass production of print media, the protection of the press under the first 
amendment, a late 1800s movement against partisan presses, and a set of professional standards 
that emerged in reaction to World War I propaganda and the growth of marketing and public 
relations.  According to Schudson, “‘Objectivity’ is at once a moral ideal, a set of reporting and 
editing practices, and an observable pattern of news writing” (Schudson 2001).  With objectivity, 
the news ceases to be openly ideological and moves toward being educational.  He goes on to 
argue that there are several measures to identify the presence of objectivity in modern journalism 
such as, allegiance to professional norms by journalists, ethnographic accounts of how journalists 
work, content analysis measuring neutrality, and resistance by journalists when their norms are 
openly challenged. 
According to Schudson, the norms of objective reporting are articulated in four ways.  
The first of these norms is a ritual solidarity of the profession where journalists meet to celebrate 
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themselves by honoring members, recognizing new members and the promotion of older 
members to higher positions in the field.  The second of these examples is how the group defines 
itself and its practices in contrast to other groups.  Specifically, it holds its own practices as 
superior to those of other groups.  The third example is the formalization and institutionalization 
of professional norms by the use of training or education (i.e. a journalism degree).  The fourth 
of Schudson’s examples is the enforcement of professional norms by superiors in the workplace.  
He then argues that these social conditions formalize the norms of objective journalism by both 
providing social cohesion and social control. 
 The norms of objective reporting are the product of early American history.  Newspapers 
in America were relatively unimportant until the rise of contention between the American 
Colonies and Britain in 1765.  Soon after partisan press – news media driven by ideology – 
became the norm in American newspapers as the public was so polarized politically that it was 
easier to choose a side than to remain neutral.  Soon after pro-British press was outlawed.  After 
the American independence, the newspapers had become equally polarized on the 
federalist/antifederalist debate. 
  By the mid 1800s the steam powered press had brought about the first mass media 
in the form of the “penny press” newspapers.  These highly commercialized newspapers heavily 
favored certain politicians and parties ignored or deplored the opposition.  However, by the late 
1800s journalism stared to shift as it formed an occupational culture and new norms.  This 
transformation was hastened as a reaction to propaganda in World War I as well as part of the 
general professionalization of many occupations in the United States, including law and 
medicine. Practitioners were increasingly expected to undergo standardized training and to 
become members of a self-regulating profession. This transformation accelerated with the first 
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world war and by the 1920s the objective press became the norm and its practices became 
standardized.  At this time, newspapers had begun to publish codes of ethics and promoted ideas 
of impartiality. 
Rise and Fall of Broadcast Media Regulation 
 In addition to the norms and practices that were created by journalists and newspapers to 
maintain the integrity of their work, the birth of a new technology created the need for further 
regulation.  During the beginning of broadcast radio, bandwidth was a prized and incredibly 
limited commodity3.  Early analog transmitters on the AM broadcast radio band required large 
bandwidths to broadcast a signal.  Thus, the set number of possible simultaneous transmissions 
on a given band was lower compared to modern transmitters that operate on higher frequencies 
with different modulation technologies.  As such the need for a regulatory body was clear 
leading to the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) in 1926 which was superseded by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934.  These commissions were created to regulate the 
allocation of bandwidth and to eventually regulate the content of radio broadcasts. 
One of the FCC’s most important and earliest regulations was the Mayflower Doctrine in 
1941 designed to, "provide full and equal opportunity for the presentation to the public all sides 
of public issues" (Pickard 2014, p104).  The Mayflower Doctrine’s primary tool to achieve this 
aim was the prohibition of editorial pieces on the radio.  The FCC argued,  
                                                
3 Broadcast radio is typically defined as commercial broadcasts such as those listened to on a 
standard AM/FM radio.  The bandwidth is the range of frequency in hertz that the modulated 
carrier wave of a radio transmission is carried on. In other words, radio transmissions exist as 
block of frequencies centered around the frequency a listener sets on the radio. As such, there are 
a limited amount of these “blocks” in a given range of frequencies. 
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“under the American system of broadcasting [and] the limitations in frequencies inherent 
to the nature of radio, the public interest can never be served by a dedication of any 
broadcast facility to the support of his own partisan ends” (Pickard 2014, p104). 
While many had questioned the constitutionality of the Mayflower Doctrine, the FCC held that 
since radio bandwidth was a limited commodity it needed to remain a politically neutral medium. 
  However, the doctrine was eventually repealed and replaced with the Fairness Doctrine 
in 1949.  This doctrine was designed for the same reasons as its predecessor, however it 
functioned in a different way.  The basic tenets of the Fairness Doctrine were, “(a) devote some 
of their programming to controversial issues of public importance and (b) allow the airing of 
opposing views on those issues” (Matthews 2011). In addition to these two basic tenets, the 
Fairness Doctrine also required broadcasters to notify anyone criticized during a broadcast and 
allow them to respond.  Furthermore, if a political candidate was endorsed during a broadcast the 
broadcaster had to invite the opposing candidates to respond (Mathews 2011). 
Just as the constitutionality of the Mayflower Doctrine was questioned by broadcasters, 
the Fairness Doctrine was subject to similar criticism.  In 1969 the FCC was forced to defend its 
application of the doctrine to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court case was the product of a 
lawsuit by journalist Fred J Cook against Red Lion Broadcasting because Cook was attacked on-
air by evangelist Billy James Hargis and was not given free air-time to defend himself as 
promised by the Fairness Doctrine.  Ultimately these events led to the Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. v. FCC in April 1969.  The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the FCC as radio 
frequencies are considered government property unlike newspapers and are not subject to the 
First Amendment.  In addition, as the FCC had argued radio frequencies are a scarce commodity 
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that are leased by the government.  As such private censorship of public resources is not 
protected by the First Amendment. 
In addition to the Fairness Doctrine was the Equal Time Rule for political candidates.  
This rule originating in the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 enforced 
fair representation of political candidates by forcing broadcasters that host a candidate to offer 
the same coverage to opposing candidates for the same office.  The Equal Time Rule is still in 
effect today however it only applies to broadcast television and radio stations.  In 1970 Nicholas 
Zapple argued that the Equal Time Rule must be expanded to include spokespeople and 
supporters of political candidates.  After Zapple’s argument to the Senate, the FCC responded 
that a Zapple Doctrine would be included in the Fairness Doctrine that would ensure “quasi-
equal opportunities” to major political parties (US Congress 1974, p23219-23222).  Ultimately, 
until its repeal in 2014, Zapple Doctrine ensured fair and equal coverage of political candidates’ 
spokespeople and supporters as long as they belonged to a major political party. 
In the 1980s, Fairness Doctrine was once again under constant scrutiny particularly by 
conservatives.  To its critics the Doctrine was an attack on the First Amendment rights of radio 
and broadcast television journalists, even after the unanimous Supreme Court ruling against this 
view.  In 1985 FCC Chairman Mark Fowler released a report criticizing the Fairness Doctrine.  
The report alleged that despite the Supreme Court ruling in the Red Lion case, the 
constitutionality of the doctrine remained unclear (Ruane 2011, p5).   
Furthermore, the report claimed that the Fairness Doctrine stifled reporters on 
controversial issues therefore “chilling” free speech. The FCC report made its case that the 
Doctrine stifled free speech by noting that most violations occurred due to failure to provide all 
valid opposing viewpoints on an issue.  They argued that broadcasters overwhelming started to 
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avoid violations by refusing to, “cover issues of public importance” (Ruane 2011, p6).  The FCC 
argued that this was evidenced by broadcasters dropping planned content out of fear of violating 
the Doctrine.    
In addition to these criticisms, the report pointed out that the Fairness Doctrine was 
ambiguously codified into law.  A 1986 court decision held that the Fairness Doctrine was not 
codified into law by Congress.  While Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 allowed 
the FCC to enforce Fairness Doctrine by acting in the public interest, it did not require the FCC 
to enforce the Doctrine (Ruane 2011, p7). The FCC repealed the Doctrine in 1987 claiming that 
it violated the First Amendment and that the scarcity argument in the Red Lion case was no 
longer valid.  In 2011, following an executive order by former President Obama, the Fairness 
Doctrine was officially revoked and removed from the FCC rulebook (Matthews 2011). 
After 60 years under the Communications Act of 1934 that founded the FCC, the 
legislation regarding telecommunications technology underwent a major overhaul with the 
Communications Act of 1996.  This new legislation was designed to deregulate the 
communications industry in hopes that the new competition would inspire innovation and lower 
prices.  One of the key changes in the law was the allowance of media cross-ownership.  This 
shift was designed to, “let any communications business compete in any market against any 
other” (FCC 2013).  The outcome by design was a smaller group of larger companies competing 
against each other.  While some aspects of the law were intended to ensure access to the internet 
for all Americans, the law primarily was designed to lax restrictions on communications 
companies by the FCC. 
During the nearly 20 years following the new communications act there has been a 
continuous struggle between the regulatory bodies and the telecommunications industry.  The 
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most notable of these struggles started with the FCC Open Internet Order of 2010.  The order 
consisted of three basic tenets.  The first of these, required Internet Service Providers (ISP) to 
disclose their network management practices to their customers.  The second of these rules was 
that ISPs could not block legal content on their networks.  The third rule ensured that ISPs would 
not be able to discriminate in transmitting lawful traffic over their network.  In 2014 the Order 
was challenged when Verizon sued the FCC stating that the FCC was overreaching their 
authority.  The court agreed and vacated two of the restrictions, the no blocking rule and the no 
discrimination rule.  As of 2018 the only remaining restriction of the Open Internet Order of 
2010 is the rule requiring the disclosure of an ISP’s network management practices to its 
customers.  Chairman Wheeler of the FCC did not appeal the court’s decision citing that the FCC 
would soon be rolling out new regulations for net neutrality. 
In 2015, Chairman Wheeler’s new policy went into effect as the Open Internet Order.  
The most crucial part of this order for consumers was the Bright Line Rules.  These three rules 
create the basis of net neutrality.  The first of these rules prohibited blocking legal content on the 
internet.  The second rule prohibited “throttling” content, unreasonably slowing legal content or 
services for customers.  The third rule prohibited paid prioritization of content, the practice of 
allowing faster speeds for certain content for their affiliates or in exchange for money.  These 
rules remained in place until late 2017, when former Verizon lawyer Ajit Pai, now 
Commissioner of the FCC led a 3-2 vote to repeal the Bright Line Rules.  
To summarize these changes in the regulatory climate, one could say that the general 
political pressure to de-regulate and reduce the role of government in structuring industries 
meant that media are now far less stringently monitored and regulated than they had been in the 
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mid-century period. Some scholars might want to regard these changes as an integral part of the 
neo-liberal restructuring of capitalism (Harvey 2005). 
Shift to a Post-Truth Era 
 
At the same time that regulation of media was reduced, geopolitical events were changing 
the climate of journalism.  In his 1992 article, A Government of Lies, Tesich described a “cultural 
syndrome” wherein Americans are so tired of the truth being associated with bad news that they 
choose to avoid truth in politics in its entirety.  Tesich’s historical analysis explaining this 
syndrome recounts the media coverage of four events, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal 
leading to President Nixon’s resignation from office, the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan 
administration, and Operation Desert Storm during the first Bush administration.  According to 
Tesich, during each of these events the American people were presented with information 
through the media that contradicted the political narrative offered by the political leaders of that 
time.  Therefore, “[i]n a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we 
want to live in some post-truth world” (Tesich 1992).  
Since Tesich’s 1992 article the term “post-truth” seems to have lain dormant until 
November 2016 when according to Google Trends, the term hit its peak popularity.  In 2017, 
there have been a myriad of articles about how the various lies of the Trump administration in 
conjunction with “fake news” have brought us into an era of post-truth politics.  Tesich’s post-
truth era differs from our own contemporary period, as he focused on information avoidance due 
to how damaging it is to our beliefs and happiness.  Our current post-truth world avoids 
information (as did Tesich’s) but it differs as it also denies the validity of claims firmly backed 
by empirical data and major media such as the large TV channels and leading print media have 
lost their primacy as news sources and platforms proliferate.  The current post-truth era offers 
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many truths delivered through a multiplicity of new technological platforms.  These platforms 
superimpose the function of entertainment on the traditional goal of informing the public; with 
entertaining “click-bait” drawing a larger audience than carefully collected information, media 
turn readily to reporting the fantastic and amusing, in many ways replicating the policies of the 
“penny press” in its search for maximum circulation through “human interest” stories (Schudson 
1981).   
Tesich begins his piece at the height of investigative reporting and the quest for truth.  He 
then illustrates through the reactions to each revelation that over time the public had become 
accustomed to lies deception.  Therefore, after each event the outrage over the scandal decreases 
until they cease to care at all.  The article comes full circle when he explains the lack of outrage 
over leaked information that contradicted the dominant discourse on why the Gulf War began.  
Whereas only 20 years earlier people were outraged by the revelations of the Pentagon papers 
and the cause of the Vietnam War. 
 The first of Tesich’s events leading to the post-truth era was in 1971 when Daniel 
Ellsberg leaked classified documents known as the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times.  
The document that became known as the Pentagon papers was commissioned by Robert 
McNamara in 1967 under the title “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam 
Policy” (Arendt 1972).  The document contained a complete list of US clandestine operations in 
Vietnam from 1945 to 1967, including a United States backed coup d'état in Vietnam, years 
before the Gulf of Tonkin incident.4  The most significant problem that arose from the leak was 
that it contradicted Lyndon Johnson’s address to congress in 1964 that ultimately lead to the Gulf 
                                                
4 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident refers to the alleged attack on the USS Maddox.  The incident led 
to a legal resolution that was ultimately used to legitimate open warfare with North Vietnam. 
 15 
 
of Tonkin Resolution (Johnson 1964).  This resolution from congress gave the Johnson 
administration military carte blanche in Southeast Asia.  In reality, the majority of American 
interest in Vietnam according to McNamara was, “not to help a friend but to contain China” 
(Arendt 1972). 
Two major outcomes resulted from Ellsberg’s leak.  The first was the Credibility Gap, a 
term used by journalists and some scholars to describe a period of mistrust in government 
statements surrounding some cold war events, most notably the Vietnam War.  At the time of the 
leak Johnson had already left office and Richard Nixon was left to deal with the fallout.  Nixon 
denied the China containment strategy and established the White House Plumbers unit to prevent 
further leaks and to discredit Ellsberg.  Despite the leak having no direct connection to Nixon 
himself, it was still damaging to the reputation of the presidential office and to the public opinion 
of the ongoing war at the time.  Therefore, the Nixon administration ordered the New York 
Times to stop publishing classified documents.  The second outcome came when the NYT 
refused Nixon’s order and therefore legal action was taken to try to silence the press.  The case 
eventually went to the Supreme Court where they ruled in favor of the New York Times.  Justice 
Black stated, “Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in 
government” (New York Times Co vs United States 1971).  In doing so, the Supreme Court set a 
precedent that would protect and empower the press to seek out and report on all political matters 
without being silenced by the government. 
Less than a year after this Supreme Court decision, the Washington Post reported that 5 
men, including a former CIA agent and a GOP security aide, were arrested while breaking into 
the Democratic National Committee office with bugging equipment (Lewis 1972, Woodward 
and Bernstein 1972).  Within months after the initial break-in the FBI was able to establish a tie 
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to the Nixon reelection campaign (Bernstein and Woodward 1972).  The investigation heated up 
considerably in 1973 leading to the infamous Saturday Night Massacre when Nixon fired special 
prosecutor Archibald Cox and abolished that office (Kilpatrick 1973).  Finally, after the Supreme 
Court forced Nixon to hand over tapes from the Oval Office, articles of impeachment were filed 
and Nixon resigned (Makenzie 1974, Kilpatrick 1974).  Furthermore, during the investigation of 
the scandal, it was revealed that Nixon’s “plumbers” violated Daniel Ellsberg’s civil rights 
leading to his release (Hersh 1982).  Between the Watergate break-in and President Nixon’s 
resignation, investigative reporting, particularly by the Washington Post, along with the 
publishing of leaked information by anonymous sources, brought this to public attention and 
widened credibility gap.  As a result, the credibility gap created a “Watergate syndrome” where 
truth had begun to be equated with bad news. This Watergate syndrome marked a new paradigm 
of American indifference to scandals in the White House. 
Between 1985 and 1986 the United States under the Reagan administration had secretly 
begun selling missiles to Iran in order to prevent Russian influence, to clandestinely support the 
Contras5 in Nicaragua, and to facilitate the release of American hostages by Hezbollah.  
Ultimately, after the investigation Reagan confessed his responsibility to the American people in 
1987 and no charges or impeachment proceedings occurred.  Shortly after, the original leaker 
Mehdi Hashemi was executed in Iran while Ronald Reagan suffered a substantial but temporary 
dip in approval ratings.  According to Tesich,  
“The high crimes and impeachable offences committed by Ronald Reagan and his 
Administration, which included our current President6, in the Iran-Contra scandal were 
                                                
5 A rebel group in Nicaragua that set out to overthrow the Sandinistas.  A goal of the early 
Reagan administration was the overthrow of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua by funding the Contra 
rebels.  This became illegal under the Boland Amendment therefore the Reagan administration 
secretly sold weapons to Iran in part to secretly funnel weapons to Contra rebels. 
6 Referring to George H.W. Bush 
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far more serious and un-American than the crimes for which Nixon was kicked out of 
office. These latest crimes attacked the very heart and soul of our Republic.” (Tesich 
1992) 
 
During the Nixon administration, the Watergate and Pentagon Papers scandals were met with 
public outcry and large-scale investigations ultimately leading to the first and only resignation of 
the US Presidency.  However, Reagan, after being involved in a scandal to overthrow a 
sovereign government by providing weapons to a diplomatic enemy, left the Presidency with a 
64% approval rating and was succeeded by his Vice President.  Tesich argued that this event 
evidenced that the American public didn’t care that this was happening and accepted Reagan’s 
omission of truth.  This way, “we would see only what our government wanted us to see, and we 
saw nothing wrong with that. We liked it that way. Our government was looking after us.” 
(Tesich 1992). 
 The final event Tesich documented was the public release of April Glaspie’s diplomatic 
cables.  Glaspie, the former US Ambassador to Iraq told Saddam Hussein, “we have no opinion 
on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait” (Mearsheimer & Walt 
2002).  This statement was released by the State Department only after the US waged a war 
against Iraq for violating the border of Kuwait.  Tesich argued that the lie in this case was that 
Glaspie, “in the firmest of tones had warned Saddam Hussein not to violate the territorial 
integrity of Kuwait” (Tesich 1992).  Ultimately this was untrue even though the American 
people were assured it was true by the State Department.  According to Tesich, the American 
people didn’t care: 
It now turns out that it was all a lie. But the fact that the Bush Administration felt safe in 
declassifying those cables shows it was no longer afraid of the truth because it knows that 
the truth will have little impact on us. The Administration’s message to us was this: 
We’ve given you a glorious victory and we’ve given you back your self-esteem. Now 
here’s the truth. Which do you prefer? The implications are terrifying. We are being told 
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that we can’t have both truth and self-esteem anymore. We have to choose. One excludes 
the other. (Tesich 1992) 
 
In a world where the truth is seemingly never positive and most always detrimental to our 
beliefs, we have chosen to deny it to enhance our lives.  For Tesich, this narrative confirms that 
we are now in a post truth era.   
While the case can be made that in 2017 Americans do care about the ongoing 
investigation into the Trump administration’s alleged collusion with Russia, public opinion about 
the scandal is split by partisanship.  Tesich argued that the post-truth era of his time was the 
American desire to believe that the government was an incorruptible force.  However, this 
concept and its application have evolved over the past 30 years into a similar but distinct form 
grounded in the dichotomy of American political partisanship. 
Transition to the Present 
 
  The world Tesich described in 1992 was once of informational avoidance and apathy, 
whereas the post-truth world as it exists today is one where truth itself is contested by language 
and rhetoric across the political spectrum.  Perhaps the most notable case of this is the denial of 
anthropogenic climate change.  While scientists are clearly in consensus that humans are largely 
responsible for climate change, belief in the data is split across political lines.  According to 
ANES’s pre-election data for the 2016 US Presidential Election, only 22% of surveyed 
Republicans believe that humans are primarily responsible for climate change. This is 
problematic as there is absolutely no scientific reason for contention about humanity’s role in 
climate change7 (Benestad et al 2015).  Despite these findings there are people who not only 
avoid or ignore the data, but actually deny that it is true.   
                                                
7 Benestad et al 2015 was a meta-analysis of the internal validity of a series of scientific articles 
that deny humanity’s role in climate change.  The findings of the analysis were that all of these 
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However, the fact that only 22% of these Republicans believe in anthropogenic climate 
change was expected since the political rhetoric from both their candidates and news sources 
deny climate change all together.  While climate change has become a political issue, countless 
news articles and broadcasts continue to deny empirical knowledge, often with political 
language.  Truth has become relative since people now get their news from sources based their 
political identity creating a vicious circle where news sources and political identities come to 
reinforce each other (Sunstein 2017).  
The current post-truth phenomenon is strongly influenced by the proliferation of 
“alternative” media.  Articles in alternative media sources commonly challenge viewpoints of 
mainstream media sources and often heavily utilize political rhetoric.  These articles are often 
not subject to the same kind of scrutiny as those of mainstream sources and often make 
unsubstantiated claims.  On one hand, alternative media allows diminished or subaltern voices to 
be heard across the political spectrum.  On the other hand, subaltern news can be questionable in 
its professionalism since it can make unsubstantiated claims.  Regardless of the validity of any of 
these claims, a dramatic shift has occurred in the way that many people view the mainstream 
media.  The ever-increasing popularity of alternative media outlets is providing a voice for the 
people who feel victimized or forgotten by the media giants.  Whereas 50 years ago people 
would either read one of a few newspapers or tune into a news radio broadcast, they can now 
turn to a nearly infinite number of news sites, blogs, podcasts, etc. 
These alternative media sources “rebalance the power of the media” (Atton 2007).  
Specifically, it challenges the institutional power mainstream media has over the field (Couldry 
                                                
studies either lack replicability and/or utilized poor methods. Therefore, the article states that 
there is no scientific basis to deny anthropogenic climate change. 
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2000).  The mainstream media relies on the legitimation it gains by following professional norms 
and processes with traditional organizational structures defined by their field (Rauch 2016, Atton 
2007).  Alternative media deviates from mainstream media in terms of its criteria for legitimation 
and its utilization lower-budget technologies for the distribution of their content since they often 
operate on a smaller scale.  Furthermore, the content of alternative media articles deviates from 
mainstream media as it seeks to amplify the voices of “marginalized and disadvantaged people” 
as well as “embracing critical and dissident perspectives that support social change” (Rauch 
2016).  As a result, these articles often rely on emotionally driven narratives and personal values 
over empirical data.  Mainstream media continue to try and stay objective by sticking to factual 
reporting and objective analysis.  However, Rauch argues that some of these practices are not 
mutually exclusive. Some mainstream media use emotion and bias while some alternative 
sources view objectivity as paramount above all else.  Thus, she argues that the separating 
boundaries between the two have become blurred to the point that the dichotomy between 
mainstream and alternative is no longer valid. 
A Brief History of Social Media, Smart Phones, and the “Share” Button 
Two concurrent technological developments have occurred in the past fifteen years that 
significantly altered the social landscape of the industrialized world.  The first of these 
technologies was social media.  While social interaction on computers has been around since 
Community Memory was established at Berkeley in 1973, it remained benign until emergence of 
Myspace in 2004 (Slaton 2001, Stenovec 2011).  During its golden years between 2005 and 
2008, Myspace was on the rise to be the most popular site on the internet (Cashmore 2006, 
Gillette 2011).  However, Myspace decidedly fell out of popular taste as evidenced by the 
massive user exodus to Facebook around 2008 (Arrington 2008).  There are a few speculated 
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causes for the demise of Myspace, ranging from failure to innovate to Corporate meddling by 
Newscorp (Dredge 2015, Halliday 2011).  Another possible cause was Myspace’s chaotic free 
for all environment as evidenced by the lack of control over by cofounder Tom Anderson. 
“In any case, I would respectfully submit that we, the users of Google+ (and Facebook or 
Twitter) don't need to see you flipping us off, nor do we need to see you naked, or 
displaying something else generally considered offensive. When a social network [lets] 
that stuff slide, it turns into a cesspool that no one wants to visit... sorta like Myspace 
was.” - Tom Anderson, Cofounder of Myspace (Gabbatt 2011) 
 
This statement by Tom Anderson was made in response to some users of Google+ protesting the 
removal of images deemed offensive or indecent by Google.  Similar measures were carried out 
on Facebook, along with screening for hate speech and provocations to violence.  Though 
Myspace gave users the ability to flag offensive or indecent images for review and removal, it 
was not well enforced. 
Meanwhile a similar timeline was unfolding in mobile phone technology.  The 
smartphone can trace its technological linage back to the IBM Simon Personal Communicator, 
first distributed in 1994 (Aamoth 2014).  Like social media, the smartphone was relatively 
benign and unheard of outside of the business world until the introduction of the prolific iPhone 
and Android phones in the late 2000s.  These two technologies converged in early 2007 with the 
release of the mobile Facebook webpage for smartphones (Arrington 2007).  Soon after in 2008, 
Facebook had begun to launch their own independent apps for smartphones and a messaging app 
in 2011 (Adweek 2008, Facebook 2011). 
 The result of this convergence was the ability to access social media anywhere and 
anytime.  The effect of this constant access has had many effects.  First, constant access has 
made social media more accessible and even integral to other applications on the phone.  Second, 
constant access has made it easier to post content to social media, especially with phones 
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containing camera and software to upload images to the user’s social media account.  The 
convergence and proliferation of these two technologies has created a ubiquitous platform for 
social interaction and information sharing.  Social media has made it easier than ever to form 
social groups without geographical boundaries with sometimes hundreds of thousands of 
members.  At the same time, social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, have made it 
easier than ever before to share news articles with other people simply by clicking the “share” 
button.  Users are also able to share news articles and web links to entire groups as well.  
Therefore, one user has the ability to spread an article to hundreds of thousands of people with a 
single click.  Meanwhile, all of this occurs on a platform that can be accessed anywhere by any 
user with a smart phone.  While this technology offers great benefits, it can also have serious 
unintended consequences as it allows for the cultivation of political extremism and excitement to 
action. 
Theory Section 
 While the previous section provided a rich historical background of the key elements of 
the contemporary media climate, these events are best understood as examples of larger 
processes endemic to modern capitalist societies.  Just as the last section illustrated large shifts in 
news media and technology, this section details shifts the relationship between media and 
consciousness using the works of theorists that have tracked this relationship for decades.  
Following the works of Debord, Schudson, Foucault, Anderson, Sunstein, and Baudrillard, this 
section examines the various ways that media affects both the individual and collective 
consciousness.  Additionally, this section looks to Bourdieu for a theoretical explanation of the 
relationship between neoliberalism and the media.  Lastly this section highlights key theoretical 
concepts used by social movement theorists to examine how movements and protests take place. 
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Social Media as the Spectacle 
 One useful way to frame social media is through the framework of Guy Debord’s Society 
of the Spectacle (1983).  In this work Debord presents the reader with the concept of the 
spectacle, a representation of culture that mediate social relation through images (Debord 1983, 
p1).  This spectacle brings society together while paradoxically isolating individuals from each 
other.  Within the spectacle, images become detached from real life and fuse together in a 
“common stream” (Debord 1983, p1).  In this way, it is the “concrete inversion of life” as the 
images presented by the spectacle are lifeless and frozen.  The representation of reality that the 
spectacle reveals to society is not merely a series of images but rather a world-view presented 
through these images.  It is presented to society as a positive indisputable force that must be 
passively accepted (Debord 1983, p3).   
The spectacle is essentially tautological, for the simple reason that its means and its ends 
are identical. It is the sun that never sets on the empire of modern passivity. It covers the 
entire globe, basking in the perpetual warmth of its own glory (Debord 1983, p3-4). 
 
The spectacle exists for the sake of itself.  It is perpetuated by the passivity of society and exists 
as a global phenomenon.  The spectacle is the product of human labor, and it is through the 
individual production of the spectacle that people become separated from each other (Debord 
1983, p 8-10). 
 In many respects, social media can be conceived of as a spectacle.  It too is a common 
stream of static images.  The images that are endlessly scrolled through on social media can take 
many forms but all of them mediate social relationships.  Like the spectacle, social media is 
overwhelming viewed as positive and passively accepted by its users.  While there are ways to 
profit from social media, they exist for the sake of themselves and the enjoyment of their users.  
Users willingly individualize themselves to produce content that keeps the spectacle going.  
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Furthermore, the social media spectacle provides several world-views for its users to subscribe 
to.  These world-views continue to perpetuate in near ideological isolation within social media. 
Surface Intensities and Aesthetic Populism 
 In many respects, social media is an epitome of the postmodern world. For their users, 
social media platforms provide an environment to share and consume images of the “ideal” life.  
Such images can include images of the users’ food, coffee, a recent purchase, original artwork, 
or a self-portrait near an interesting object or place.  Additionally, users often share content 
designed for mass distribution on the platform such as memes or news stories.  This content gets 
sorted into a “common stream” for consumption and reproduction by the platform’s users.   
 Frederic Jameson, like Debord and Baudrillard; was critical of the reproduction and 
consumption of images.  For Jameson, social media would be a technology of reproduction that 
provides a new form of consumption, the consumption of consumption (Jameson 1991, p276).  
Whereas a television commercial aims to sell a product, social media (through the labor of its 
users) depicts the consumption of products by other users to sell a lifestyle.  This concept is 
exemplified by the fascination with food pictures on social media.  When a user chooses to share 
a picture of their food at a restaurant, the purpose is not to advertise for the restaurant but to 
advertise the consumption of the restaurant’s food by the user.  Additionally, when a user shares 
a news article on social media, the purpose is not to promote the New York Times or Buzzfeed 
but rather to advertise that they had read or agreed with the article. 
 Furthermore, Jameson argues that that one common trait of postmodern theories is the 
effacement of the “frontier between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture” 
(Jameson 1991, p2-3).  In this sense, postmodern culture is dominated by “aesthetic populism,” a 
cultural hierarchy that defies the previous norms of aesthetic distinction in favor of mass 
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produced kitsch.  Underneath its “glossy advertising images,” this mass-(re)produced culture is 
depthless and superficial, composed only of simulacra (Jameson 1991, p9).  In this surface-deep 
society, intense emotion takes a similar form.  Surface intensities, the result of our loss of 
historicity and depth, mimic the appearance of the schizophrenia.8  These intensities can range 
from anxiety to euphoria and are characterized as sudden intense and fragmented moments of 
feeling.  Such intensities are commonplace on social media where depthless content frequently 
sparks both outrage and euphoria. 
Informational Cascades, Echo Chambers, and the Rise of Extremes  
One of the basic design features of Facebook and Twitter that separated them from their 
predecessors is their streamlined and minimalistic appearances.  While this should not be 
problematic it has become so in that all shared content looks nearly identical no matter where it 
comes from.  This means that an article written by Pulitzer Prize winner Charlie Savage will fit 
the same format and be placed in the same space as something akin to a tabloid article.  The 
aesthetics of these platforms conflate alternative and mainstream media.  While not all 
alternative media is fictitious, some of it exists completely outside the bounds of fact.  These 
sensationalized, heavily spun, or sometimes entirely fictional stories were once confined to 
tabloid racks and no directly connects us to the outermost fringes of the internet.  
In an informational cascade, people cease relying at a certain point on their private 
information or opinions. They decide instead on the basis of the signals conveyed by 
others.  Social media provide an obvious breeding ground for cascades and as a result, 
thousands or even millions of people who consult sources a of particular kind will move 
in one or another direction, or even believe something that is quite false.  
(Sunstein 2017, p111) 
 
                                                
8 In the Lacanian or psychoanalytic sense, not to be confused with the actual psychological 
condition 
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The social media environment is one that inspires a herd mentality.  When enough people start 
fixating on a particular news article or topic it will spread quickly through people sharing the 
content.  This is exacerbated further by the algorithms that curate the content.  On a platform 
where fake news is visually similar to real news, “informational cascades”  ̶  where a news article 
goes viral in terms of its reach – accelerating the article into the mainstream of society. 
This concept falls in line with the earlier example about Republicans and climate change.  
When confronted with crosscutting ideas social media users will often be more critical or avoid 
the idea entirely (Bakshy et al 2015).  On the other hand, articles that align with the user’s beliefs 
will be more readily shared and liked by the user.  The algorithms that curate content of 
Facebook react to these choices and display more favorable content and less content that 
challenges the user’s world-view.  As a result, the user now sets the boundaries of knowledge 
while algorithms build the walls to shield those users from opposing viewpoints.   
These findings align with Cass Sunstein’s commentary on the “daily me,” an 
individualized internet experience of curated content to fit the user’s preferences (Sunstein 
2017).  He argues that there are two growing dangers in regard to curation of internet content.  
First is our ability as individuals to filter out what we do not want to see. The second issue is the 
ability of the social media platform to filter content on our behalf: 
Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are central to democracy itself… They are 
important to ensure against fragmentation, polarization, and extremism, which are 
predictable outcomes of any situation in which like-minded people speak only with 
themselves. (Sunstein 2017, p7-8) 
 
The absence of these unanticipated experiences and ideas confines people to narrow but extreme 
world-views often without them realizing it. Furthermore, Sunstein argues that these 
unanticipated viewpoints are an essential part of free expression, and to hide them would be 
equivocal to censorship. 
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 However, even though some information is concealed by the barriers of user choice and 
algorithms, obscure and unpopular ideas are more accessible on social media than they would be 
without it.  During the Watergate scandal, there were fewer news sources and everybody for the 
most part read the same stories.  Conversely in 2017, there are thousands of sources for news on 
social media, often in contradiction with each other and we can choose what perspectives they 
prefer: 
 The advent of right-wing talk radio and Fox News; the influence of social sites like 
Facebook, Twitter, Reddit; and the mainstreaming of conspiracy sites like InfoWars, 
which had almost five million visitors in the last month. By allowing partisans to live in 
their separate informational and misinformational bubbles, and, in some cases, to allow 
real news to be rendered as false — and false news to be rendered as true — they have all 
contributed to the calcification of the national divide. (Rutenberg 2017) 
 
There is a news article to support just about any viewpoint these days and these articles can 
spread like wildfire even when they contradict empirical fact or the common-sense narrative.  
The fragmentation of information sources can give way to the fragmentation of society by 
allowing us to polarize ourselves into groups often against each other.  
 According to Sunstein, polarization is the natural outcome of being surrounded by like-
minded people and agreeable ideas.  With polarization comes separation.  Once a group has 
isolated itself from the others, extreme ideas can begin to form in the direction that brought the 
group together in the beginning.  Separated from opposing viewpoints, groups are further 
polarized, which makes it easier to discredit an idea from outside the group (Sunstein 2011).  For 
Sunstein, social media allows groups to congregate and isolate themselves to the point of 
becoming extremists just like cults and terrorists (Sunstein 2017). 
 Ultimately the rise of fake news, its proliferation on a technology that is ubiquitous in 
western society, and the polarized extremist groups fed by these stories, have redrawn the 
boundaries of society and knowledge.  The boundary of fact and fiction is no longer confined to 
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established methods of journalism or science.  In fact, there are established groups with 
thousands of members on Facebook that believe the earth is flat and there is a giant ice wall 
holding all the water in at the edges (Roose 2017).  In addition to these obscure groups there are 
also several extreme political groups of Facebook as well.  Typical group interaction consists of 
a member sharing an article or link and the users comment on it.  Some of these groups like 
Uncle Sam’s Misguided Children are also an aggregated news source.  This means that these 
groups have a staff that collect news from elsewhere and can rewrite the articles with a heavy 
political bias. This diminishes the original facts and promotes an emotionally driven narrative.  
Groups like these are the ultimate echo chambers – akin to intellectual silos – as they promote an 
extreme and narrow viewpoint with no outside opinion contradicting the ideas of the group. 
Competing Knowledges and Counter-history 
 In addition to understanding how echo chambers are formed and how they produce 
politically extreme people, it is also important to understand the knowledge within the echo 
chambers.  Such knowledge may clearly be fictitious to the outsider.  However, those within the 
echo chamber may believe this knowledge with the same tenacity that the outsider would use to 
dismiss it.  While this problem has all the pieces to construct a Gettier-style problem, there is 
another way to frame the problem.  Rather than examining the contradictory knowledges through 
an understanding of truth and false, or truth and justified true belief, it is crucial to simply 
understand the knowledge base of an echo chamber.  In addition to side-stepping some difficult 
epistemological questions outside the scope of this thesis, viewing the knowledge base of 
extreme conservatives and their history better help to understand why the cases examined within 
the thesis occurred. 
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 The first step to such an analysis is to conceptualize the echo chamber as one that 
reverberates discourse rather than ideology.  Throughout Foucault’s work the notion of ideology 
if refuted in the traditional sense.  Rather than a clumsy authoritarian apparatus, for Foucault 
repression is subtle and refined, it is an insidious notion that becomes nearly inseparable from the 
self (Foucault 1980, p118).  On the other hand, discourses are contextual to the time and place 
they come about (Foucault 1980, p112).  These discourses form the basis for how people 
conceptualize knowledge and understand the world.  Much like Thomas Kuhn’s paradigms, 
“These are not simply new discoveries, there is a whole new 'regime' in discourse and forms of 
knowledge” (Foucault 1980, p112).  
 Just as the Newtonian paradigm provided a profoundly different understanding of 
scientific phenomena than any other scientific paradigm, an extreme conservative discourse will 
provide a different view a social phenomenon than other political discourses.  These views shape 
a knowledge of the social world and in Sunstein’s echo chamber, they reverberate and intensify.  
This knowledge is not bound by an abstract notion like absolute truth, rather the truth within the 
knowledge is determined by the dominance it has over other knowledges.  Foucault implies a 
hierarchy of knowledges ranging from disqualified knowledges at the bottom to popular or 
common sense knowledge at the top (Foucault 1980, p82).  These knowledges are in competition 
with each other to become canon in the popular discourse.   
 In addition to these competing knowledges there are also counterhistories.  For Foucault, 
history is a product of discourse and an “intensifier of power” (Foucault 2003, p68).  History has 
been used countless times to reinforce the power of governments by emphasizing the “yoke of 
the law and the luster of glory.”  Since history is the product of discourse and discourse is the 
product of power, historical discourse is outside of the bounds of truth and rather dictated by the 
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dominant power structure of the time.  Furthermore, if history is reframed in a way that does not 
glorify the sovereign, it can be seen as a “Janus-faced reality: the triumph of some means the 
submission of others” (Foucault 2003, p70).  This counterhistory demonstrates struggles and 
resistance, but most importantly, it diminishes the exaggerated glory of the sovereign and the 
power of law. 
 Counterhistories are present in every discourse of thought.  They are constructed as a 
record of the knowledge of the discourse.  Unlike the absolutist view of the past under Roman 
history, a single event can have multiple histories as it is remembered through different 
discourses.  For example, the disruption of an alt-right speaker at a university, like Milo 
Yiannopolis at DePaul University can have more than one history.  Most people viewed the 
incident as inevitable and justifiable to stop a man with no academic or political qualifications 
from presenting his racist discourse.  On the other hand, his followers’ counterhistory depicts the 
event disruption as an affront to free speech and that conservatives are being unfairly 
marginalized by a left-leaning university as part of a greater war against conservatives.  It is safe 
to say that neither of these ways of framing the event are dispassionate.  As such neither of these 
histories are true, but they are also not entirely false.  It is important to frame these histories 
outside of the bounds to the abstract notion of truth and instead on the concrete notion of 
political power. 
Political Functions of the News 
 
 In addition to his specific analysis of journalism, Schudson sees “the news” as a 
fundamental practice in modern capitalist societies and “the public” as a force that emerged with 
these societies, and it is this general examination of news and the public.  According to Schudson 
(2008), the news media in a democratic society fulfills six functions, (1) it informs, (2) it 
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investigates, (3) it analyzes, (4) it creates social empathy, (5) it creates a public forum, and (6) 
mobilizes people and organizations.  These functions serve a democratic society in different 
ways however a single “news organ” can fulfil multiple functions.  In addition, when a particular 
source utilizes more than one of these functions, it can undermine its reliability to serve another 
function. 
 The first function of the news is to inform the public.  The news tells the public things 
that it would otherwise not know about the government. In doing so, the news gives the public 
the ability to critique and act on the information reported. 
Here journalism’s function is educational, informing the public—the ultimate 
democratic authority—of what its political representatives are doing, what dangers 
and opportunities for society loom on the horizon, and what fellow citizens are up 
to, for better and for worse. The educational function of journalism puts the public in 
the front seat and enables the citizenry to participate in self-government. (Schudson 2008, 
p9) 
 
Educating the public about current events, policies, and political actions promotes social 
awareness of what is going on by creating transparency in otherwise secret or unseen events.  In 
doing so, the news serves to empower the public by forming a collective that comes together and 
participates in the political process in a more direct way than previously possible.  With credible 
news grounded in fact, an informed public can come together and engage in political action. 
 The second function of journalism is investigation.  The investigative wing of journalism 
works toward uncovering secrets that would be contrary to the values and interests of the public.  
In this way journalists act as the “watchdogs” of democracy that seek out tyranny or corruption 
and expose it to the public.  Schudson argues that this happens in two ways.  First it inspires fear 
in powerful leaders that their actions could become public at any moment, which ensures that the 
leadership will regulate itself in a way that aligns with the interests of the public.  Second, “in 
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alignment with the Habermasian public sphere”, investigative reporting, “inspires thinking, 
reflection, debate, and engagement among highly attentive elites” (Schudson 2008).   
Unlike other functions, the investigative side of the news always works in a politically 
negative way.  This means that rather than promoting and furthering an idea or policy, this 
function always attempts to foil certain ideas and actions to maintain the status quo.  In its ideal 
application, investigative journalism will expose bad things to prevent them from happening 
rather than promoting the good.  Therefore, it can keep politicians honest and expose injustice 
which is similar but not identical to informing the public.  Whereas objectivity assumes an “open 
simple world” that can be described with relative ease, watchdog investigation assumes a “veiled 
complicated world” wherein the most important information is deliberately hidden from the 
public (Schudson 2008) 
The third function of the news is its analysis of complicated material or events for the 
public.  It is also known as explanatory journalism and its primary task is to convert scholarly or 
legal information into accessible public information.  For example, it could take something like a 
healthcare bill to be voted on by the Senate and explain in common language what the bill means 
for the public.  It can also analyze the efficacy of political or military decisions by devoting 
serious effort to producing a report grounded in data similar to academic work.  It is designed to 
educate the public on complicated issues and their effects in a very deep way without obscuring 
issues with jargon or technical academic terminology.  These articles are readily identifiable as 
they typically have the words “what [the subject] means for you” in the title or sub heading. 
The fourth function of the news according to Schudson is the creation of social empathy, 
which examines how individuals or small groups link private concerns to public issues.  Much 
like ethnographic methods of sociology social empathy stories work to show a case on the micro-
 33 
 
level and explain how this case embodies a much larger issue.  This process humanizes the issues 
at hand thus helping the public understand the issues by empathizing with the subject’s private 
concerns.  Perhaps some of the most notable and earliest of these reports according to Schudson 
were Bill Moyers’ interviews with people affected by then President Reagan’s budget cuts 
(Schudson 2008).  This method provides access to a part of public life not experienced by 
everyone and serves a vital function in that the stories are not explicitly political but rather serve 
to bring the public together through sharing individual struggles. 
The fifth function of journalism the creation of a public forums, traditionally trough the 
op-ed page in newspapers.  The defining characteristic of the op-ed page from the rest of the 
paper is that the articles published on it are typically sourced from outside the publication.  The 
result is a section that depicts the interests and opinions of the public through writers, columnists, 
academics, and regular people.  While television diminished this type of journalism by 
maintaining a singular perspective on the world, the op-ed allows for many perspectives.  As the 
United States, has started to move toward the internet for its news in recent years, and with 
access to many more publications, the public is now able to see more of these articles.  
Furthermore, in the current interactive era of the internet readers of these articles routinely 
comment on them for others to see. 
Finally, the sixth function of the news is its ability to mobilize the public toward a 
political end.  In particular, partisan journalism’s purpose is to rally an ideologically aligned 
group toward political action.  Schudson argues that this was the dominant form of journalism in 
the past and that newspapers were often subsidized by political parties.  Therefore, rather than 
objective reporting, partisan journalism’s goal is “political cheerleading” and mobilizing its 
readership to act towards a political end.  The dominance of this type of reporting was ousted by 
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a reform movement started in the late 1800s that pushed for an educational perspective over a 
partisan perspective in journalism and elections.  Even in 2017 the majority mainstream media 
has continued to remain mostly objective with minimal partisan bias.  Despite this, partisan bias 
remains a secondary characteristic of most mainstream media with its primary focus on objective 
reporting of verifiable information. 
Construction of Communal Identity: Benedict Anderson 
 In addition to the functions Schudson provides his readers, news media also ties people 
together to create communities.  Benedict Anderson argues in his book Imagined Communities 
that mass print media ties its readers together, giving them a sense of community, without ever 
actually interacting with each other.  Anderson asserts that a “national consciousness” is formed 
at the most primordial level by the creation and proliferation of “print-languages” (Anderson 
2006).  These languages create a unified communication method that many people understand. 
This is still relevant in today’s news media as the language used must be neither simplistic or too 
sophisticated.  Therefore, news outlets make themselves accessible to the masses by writing at a 
reading level that aligns with the average education of their readerships.  Furthermore, Anderson 
argues that print-languages provided “fixity” to language making it possible for us to read 100-
year-old text and also ensuring that in 100 years, people will still be able to read news written 
today.  These languages which are closer to some dialects than others become “languages of 
power.”  The dominance of these languages allows them to win out over other dialects or 
languages in a country.  Ultimately, when the entire population uses the same language it creates 
a national identity that the entire population shares. 
 In addition to print-language, mass media also creates a sense of national consciousness 
by reporting local and world news.  As a result, otherwise isolated individuals are brought 
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together by the news they read about their nation and other nations.  Even though any individual 
will never know all or even most of the members of a nation, they are all part of an imaginary 
community. "It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006).  This communion comes from the “collective 
awareness” experienced by reading the newspaper as it connects readers to something larger that 
they all share a part in (Sheller 2015).  Even today when printed newspapers are nearly extinct, 
the concept remains as people connect to this collective awareness through an equally mobile 
source in the forms of internet media and social media (Sheller 2015).  In fact, social media 
create an imagined community with its own characteristics and sense of communal 
consciousness (Kavoura 2014).  It is conceivable to think of the function of the Newsfeed of 
Facebook in the same way as the newspaper.  Both the Newsfeed and its ancestor the newspaper 
are the products of their own kind of “print capitalism” and produce their own vernaculars, 
communities, and consciousness.  The only addition in the Newsfeed over the newspaper is the 
inclusion of comments, opinions, and the activities of fellow members of the community in much 
greater frequency than previously possible.  Therefore, in many ways not only does social media 
provide all the necessary components of an imagined community, it can in fact even function as 
its own virtual nation (Al-Rawi 2016). 
Media Events and Hyperreality 
 Media events can take many shapes, from police chasing an infamous now white Ford 
Bronco to planes crashing into towers.  These ceremonious events are the exception that bring 
the media-connected world together to watch cathartically while waiting for the resolution to the 
crisis (Dayan and Katz 1994).  Media events are powerful shared experiences for many since 
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they don’t happen every day.  For example, most of Americans know exactly where they were 
and what they were doing on the morning of September 11th 2001.  Many of us old enough to 
remember also remember waiting anxiously to hear the verdict of OJ Simpson’s trial in 1995.  
Such events provide a connection between people that have never met in the same way as 
Benedict Anderson’s concept of national consciousness.  However, while media events reaffirm 
the community by the communal experience of the event, the same events can divide a 
community along its currently existing “fault lines” such as race, gender, class, et cetera (Fiske 
and Hancock 2016).   
While America watched the media coverage of the protests in Ferguson Missouri 
following the death of Michael Brown, this communal experience was felt differently by some 
people compared to others.  In addition, media commentators provided viewers with multiple 
versions of the Michael Brown shooting that caused the subsequent protest.  In essence, the 
media provided with two narratives regarding the initial shooting, Brown as the victim and 
Brown as the criminal.  The situation was similar to the Rodney King affair from the early 1990s 
in both the nature of the event and the media coverage of the event.  During these media events, 
“all media commentators present their view of events as truth” (Fiske and Glynn 1995, p516).   
In Fiske and Glynn’s Trials of the Postmodern (1995), the authors present the concepts of 
“videolow” and “videohigh” (Fiske and Glynn 1995, p513-518). Videolow is defined as the out 
of focus, blurry, ambiguous image. Inversely, videohigh is the in focus, sharp version that can be 
broken down frame-by-frame.  In a courtroom videohigh is often held highly as the orator of 
truth, however videohigh may not always be amenable to a media commentator’s depiction of 
truth.  Such is the case in Fiske and Glynn’s example of how Rush Limbaugh aligned the footage 
of Rodney King and the police to his version of truth (Fiske and Glynn 1995, p515-516).  In this 
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example Limbaugh manipulated the narrative in the footage by looping a three second clip of 
King moving his leg.  Limbaugh argued that this was evidence of King lunging at the police.  In 
this way, he utilized videolow footage in the same way that a courtroom would use videohigh 
footage (Fiske and Glynn 1995, p515). 
During both the shooting of Michael Brown and the subsequent protests, different 
narratives were provided in a similar way.  In the case of the shooting, there was no video, only 
opposing witness accounts and indications of a struggle between Brown and officer Darren 
Wilson.  During the week-long protests in Ferguson Missouri news outlets were able to present 
narratives conducive to their versions of truth by controlling what footage they released.  On one 
side news organizations emphasized footage of a heavily militarized police force moving against 
unarmed African-American protestors.  On the other side, the footage was confined to criminal 
behavior and looting to create a narrative that the protesters were dangerous criminals.  In these 
situations, “reality is always amenable to reconfiguration through the process of simulation.  
That is truths are never final, stable, or fixed for all times and places.” (Fiske and Glynn 1995, 
512).  Ultimately, the event probably contained elements of both narratives, but the reality of the 
situation was lost to the political polarization of its media coverage.   
Similarly, these issues can also be framed through Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the 
“hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1994).  Like Debord, Baudrillard is concerned about the role of images 
in society.  For Baudrillard, society isn’t merely mediated by images but rather bombarded by 
images.  This bombardment converts the social into the masses just as Debord’s spectacle 
perpetuates passivity in society (Baudrillard 1983, p23-24 p100; Debord 1983, p3).  These 
images according to Baudrillard are often conflated for the real thing they represent and in many 
cases, precede the real thing in our perceptions. 
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Henceforth, it is the real it is the map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra 
– it is the map that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it 
would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map. (Baudrillard 1994, 
p166) 
 
Baudrillard is explaining through an allegory that a defining characteristic of post-
modernity is that the model or simulation precedes the real.  This simulation has no real origin or 
source.  Despite this if the simulation is damaged or destroyed, our understanding of that which it 
describes becomes damaged as well.  If the map in the example has greater primacy in our 
understanding than the territory it describes, then our understanding of the territory is baseless.  
Baudrillard argued that the errors that differentiated the map from the territory gave the map its 
charm.  Furthermore, the conquest for “ideal coexensivity” is what transformed the map into the 
simulation that can be then simulated indefinitely.  In this process the hyperreal – simulations 
without origin that gain primacy in our understanding over reality – sets the parameters for 
understanding reality. 
However, a representation of “basic reality” like a map or a photograph is not 
immediately hyperreal.  Baudrillard argues that there are four successive phases a representation 
goes through in its path to becoming hyperreal.  First, the representation exists as a reflection of 
reality. It does so as being an attempt to create an equivalent to the real object.  Second, it 
obscures or distorts the basic reality it represents.  In this state the image is recognized as 
simulacra rather than reality because something is missing or altered.  Third, the representation 
masks the absence of the reality it represents.  In this stage the image staves off the evanescence 
of reality by retaining a simulation of what once was.  Finally, the image reaches its fourth stage 
when it is no longer related to basic reality and exists as pure simulacrum.  At this point the 
image is more real than the reality it was based upon and it becomes hyperreal. 
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The Disneyland imaginary is neither true or false: it is a deterrence machine set up in 
order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real. Whence the debility, the infantile 
degeneration of this imaginary. It's meant to be an infantile world, in order to make us 
believe that the adults are elsewhere, in the "real" world, and to conceal the fact that real 
childishness is everywhere, particularly among those adults who go there to act the child 
in order to foster illusions of their real childishness. (Baudrillard 1994, p175) 
 
On the first level, hyperreality implies an inability to distinguish reality from a preferable 
simulation that also seems real.  However hyperreal images are more than an illusion, in many 
respects they become more real than the reality they are sourced from.  In the Disneyland 
example, Baudrillard argues that a physical space was created “to reverse the fiction of the real.”  
That fiction in this case is that real childishness cannot be experienced by adults.  Therefore, they 
go to this “infantile world” to escape adulthood and to pretend the real adults are elsewhere.   
However, for the adults nostalgic of their childhood Disneyland offer more than an 
illusion.  In this case Disneyland is a real place with real cartoon characters walking around, a 
place where all the Disney stories are real.  To these people, at least for a moment, the employee 
in the Mikey Mouse costume and the equally simulated space of Disneyland become the real 
manifestation of childhood and all the fantasy that surrounds it.  In the case of this thesis, the 
concept of hyperreality offers a unique way of framing fake news articles and the social media 
world.  When framing social media through Debord’s spectacle, social media becomes a 
“separate pseudoworld” that remains relatively static as it can only be observed.  On the other 
hand, framing social media as a hyperreal social space allows for a dynamic world that 
individuals interact with rather than observe. 
Neoliberalism and the Media 
 The beginning of this chapter detailed the rise of objective news media through the 
creation of new norms and professional standards that consecrate the boundaries of professional 
journalism.  In addition to these boundaries, the FCC was created in part to ensure fair and 
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objective reporting of the news on broadcast media such as radio and some television.  These 
regulations were continuously challenged in the name of the First Amendment and eventually 
repealed starting in 1987.  Furthermore, the professional standards and norms that separate 
professional journalism from tabloid reporting were successfully challenged by alternative media 
due to deregulation and new media formats.   
The discontinuity present in modern journalism – the creation then abdication of norms, 
values, etc. – suggests a field that is at odds with itself.  Pierre Bourdieu argued that the 
journalistic field is stuck between holding up the norms and standards that consecrate its 
professional boundaries and market pressure (Bourdieu 1996, p70).  On one hand, professional 
norms such as a code of ethics legitimize the profession and separate journalists from paparazzi 
or tabloid reporters.  On the other hand, the field has been commercialized and, “it favors those 
cultural producers most susceptible to the seductions of economic and political powers” 
(Bourdieu 1996, p70).  The pressure to make a profit and to become popular in the market are 
antithetical to the values of professional journalism.  The only way to sidestep this conundrum is 
to gain economic and political autonomy, something that few news organizations have. 
 Just as news organizations face market pressure at odds with its values, regulatory bodies 
such as the FCC can find themselves in similar positions.  FCC Commissioner and former 
attorney for Verizon Wireless, Ajit Pai recently dissolved the protections put in place by his 
predecessor.  However, this shift only represents one piece of a 30-year process of deregulating 
broadcast media in favor of large telecommunications corporations.  In fact, such corporations 
did not exist prior to the Communications Act of 1996, a law designed to create fewer but larger 
telecommunications companies by allowing media cross-ownership.   
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 The common thread behind both phenomena is a philosophy that, “liberty exists in 
private spaces in which individuals are free to enact their will when circumstances permit” (Stein 
2004, p106).  The neoliberal philosophy presents a utopia for its followers that is only achieved 
by financial deregulation.  The neoliberal process is transformative and destructive to political 
measures and collective structures that contradict pure free market logic (Bourdieu 1998, p2). 
The neoliberal programme draws its social power from the political and economic power 
of those whose interests it expresses […] Neoliberalism tends on the whole to favour 
severing the economy from social realities and thereby constructing, in reality, an 
economic system conforming to its description in pure theory, that is a sort of logical 
machine that presents itself as a chain of constraints regulating economic agents. 
(Bourdieu 1998, p2) 
 
The proliferation of neoliberal policy has primarily been successful because some of its 
beneficiaries have considerable political and economic power.  The power of those that 
neoliberalism serves lends a social power to the philosophy, giving it momentum and making 
deregulation seem like a viable policy to even those who gain nothing from its implementation.  
In this way neoliberal policy becomes a panacea and any failure in the policy is not the fault of 
the philosophy but rather the regulations that limit its full implementation. 
 In relation to news media neoliberal philosophy undermines the symbolic capital in the 
field by redefining success as market success.  Rather than ensuring fair representation and 
objectivity, or hiring professionally trained journalists, many successful news outlets utilize 
sensationalism and “professional bloggers.”  In the web2.0 age anyone with a Facebook account 
can produce and distribute news with the same efficacy as large professional organizations.  
Success in these alternative media is determined by market success and advertising.  One key 
factor to the success of alternative media is the lack of any effective regulatory tool.  In this way 
neoliberal philosophy and its policies have reshaped the journalistic field by making it irrelevant 
to producing successful news. 
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Mobilization and Social Movements 
 In addition to studying the relationship between fake news and social media, this thesis 
also examines social media’s use as a tool to mobilize extreme conservative fringe groups.  Most 
of these groups have no physical presence and extensively utilize social media to communicate 
in relative secrecy.  The extreme conservative groups that exist on the fringes of society due to 
their violent or xenophobic beliefs must enact a unique set of practices to meet like-minded 
people, recruit new followers, and to spread their discourse.  Historically white supremacy and 
other xenophobic movements faced the struggle of finding people to join the movements due to 
the taboo nature of the groups.  The internet and particularly social media have made meeting 
like-minded people easier than in the past as well as offering tools to disseminate information 
and organize events with relative secrecy.  Despite the uniqueness of this situation, like most 
movements, the rise of the alt-right and other groups that protested in Charlottesville followed 
the formulas laid out by Charles Tilly, Sydney Tarrow, and others. 
 Before this rally or any protest in general, a group of people need to become mobilized.  
Mobilization begins at the moment people begin to make contentious claims (Tilly Tarrow 2015, 
p38-39).  The mobilization typically intensifies as the resources to make collective claims 
increase, and demobilization occurs as these resources wane.  In many cases this process of 
mobilization will give way to a counter mobilization by polity or other political actors.  If these 
processes continue to intensify a contentious performance or event will occur (Tilly Tarrow 
2015, p39).  Typically, the analysis of a contentious performance starts with reconstructing the 
series of events using an “event catalog” (Tilly 2002, p249).  In this case, “contentious 
performances are relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of political actors 
makes collective claims on some other set of political actors” (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, p14).  In 
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this formula one set of actors chooses and enacts the appropriate performance from their 
repertoire of contention (McAdam et al 2001, p14-15).  Performances can take a variety of forms 
from riots to online protests. 
 In the case of the Unite the Right rally that happened over the course of two days in 
Charlottesville Virginia, the original actors were the polity (Charlottesville city officials) and a 
loose collective of extreme conservative factions.  The extreme right has a wide repertoire of 
contention, ranging from giving a particular university 1-star ratings on Facebook to KKK and 
neo-Nazi rallies.  For this contentious episode, they chose a rally and a pre-rally march to protest 
the removal of the Robert E Lee statue from the park.  In response, several liberal groups and 
protestors countermobilized against the event and shifted the contention from the polity vs alt-
right to alt-right vs liberal protestors.  With the shift in contention came a shift in repertoires 
from a rally to a violent protest. 
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Section 2: Methodology 
Questions 
 
The analysis of these cases answer the following questions: 
• How are social media utilized by political actors and contemporary media, and ordinary 
people to disseminate false or misleading information? 
• How have social media aided in the mobilization of previously unpopular extremist 
social/political movements in the US? 
Methodology 
Event Catalogs 
These questions pose a unique methodological concern for a sociological thesis.  Since 
the objects of analysis are events in the recent past rather than individuals, the success of the 
analysis hinges on finding a method of examining historical events that is still firmly grounded in 
sociology.  To this end several sociologists9 have created useful methods of examining the past 
under the lens of our discipline.  One useful method often used in the study of contentious 
episodes is the creation of event catalogs. “An event catalog is a set of descriptions of multiple 
social interactions collected from a delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform 
procedures” (Tilly 2002, p249).  Additionally, similar methods are used in criminology and 
historical demography.  According to Tilly, event catalogs focus around these three questions: 
• “How does the phenomenon under investigation leave traces?”  
• “How can analysts elicit or observe those traces?”  
• “Using those traces, how can analysts reconstruct specified attributes, elements, causes, 
or effects of the phenomenon?” (Tilly 2002, p249) 
                                                
9 See William Sewell’s “Three Temporalities: Toward a Sociology of the Event (1996) 
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Both phenomena under investigation leave observable traces that allow the selected cases to be 
reconstructed.  Additionally, since Tilly’s application of this method was designed from the start 
to analyze contentious episodes, it is best suited over other historical methods to answer these 
questions.  The analysis does evoke certain elements of Theda Skocpol’s comparative historical 
analysis, however Skocpol’s method is better suited for comparing entire movements or 
revolutions rather than individual cases in a single movement. 
Data and Analysis 
 Following the event catalog method and using cases in Tilly’s other works10 as templates, 
each case was reconstructed into a narrative from archival and journalistic sources.  After the 
reconstruction, each event was coded by the same basic criteria11 and a table was constructed 
with the results.  Additionally, the analysis coded for emergent themes that were common to at 
least half the cases.  Furthermore, images of key events were provided to add a richer description 
of the cases to the reader.  After the data was coded, it was discussed within the framework of 
existing theories.  This discussion creates theoretical explanations to answer the questions while 
utilizing the cases under observation.  In the future, such explanations could be substantiated 
further with different methods in further research to increase the generalizability of the results. 
Case Selection 
 One basic tenet in creating effective event catalogs is the use of uniform methods for case 
selection.  As such a set of criteria were created to select cases best suited to answer the research 
questions.  Fake news cases were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Case must utilize social media to disseminate false information. 
                                                
10 Contentious Politics 2nd Edition (2015) and The Politics of Contentious Violence (2003) 
11 All events were coded by, origin, year, form, audience, platform, and outcomes. See figure 1 
on pg. 58-59 for results. 
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• Each case must be distinct from the other cases. 
• Each case must be grounded in political discourse common to social media 
• Each case must link directly to a significant event of controversy in the real world 
The selection for the mobilization case was a bit limited as large-scale conservative extremist 
events are a recent phenomenon.  While there have been many smaller KKK and neo-Nazi 
demonstrations in recent history, the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville Virginia was a 
natural choice.  Additionally, the ideal case to answer the second research question must utilize 
social media as a mobilizing tool.  Unite the Right is one of the few events of this type that this 
criterion could be confirmed without unique access to the group. 
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Section 3: Cases 
The Real Effects of Fake News 
The Birther Movement 
 The Birther Movement is the amalgamation of several conspiracy theories questioning 
the location of the birth of President Obama and the validity of his birth certificate.  The 
conspiracy was most notably pushed by President Trump.  Despite this both Donald Trump and 
Ted Cruz pushed the claim that their democratic opponent Hillary Clinton was truly responsible 
for the conspiracy (Trump 2015, Farley 2015).  In fact, the term “Birther” as well as the 
allegations regarding President Obama’s birth and religion originated from Andy Martin in 2004 
(Cheney 2016). 
 Andy Martin is a perennial republican candidate who has frequently ran for the US 
Senate in Illinois.  The Birther Movement was born shortly after Barack Obama’s speech at the 
2004 Democratic National Convention when Martin spoke out against then Senator Obama 
claiming, “Obama is a Muslim who has concealed his religion” (Rutenberg 2008).  Martin had 
continued to portray more falsehoods in a Fox News program where he claimed that, “[Obama] 
had once trained to overthrow the government” (Rutenberg 2008).  These claims were soon used 
as a starting point for several other Obama related conspiracies.  The whole affair had spun out 
of control by 2008 during Obama’s Presidential campaign when Donald Trump, Joseph Farah, 
and Jerome Corsi among others brought these conspiracies to the mainstream.  With the 
conspiracy in the mainstream, Martin filed a lawsuit against the state of Hawai’i for a writ of 
mandamus12 to seek verification of Obama’s birth by the release of his long-form birth 
                                                
12 An order to comply from a superior court 
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certificate13.  The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai’i denied Martin’s petition on October 
22nd 2008, prompting several additional lawsuits by others questioning Barack Obama’s 
eligibility for the US Presidency. 
 Ultimately the smear campaign against Barack Obama was widely successful in the sense 
that the claims were so readily believed, even though they lacked any evidence.  While Donald 
Trump, Fox News, World News Daily, and Jerome Corsi’s Obama Nation all had a substantial 
effect on promoting these false claims, the internet and social media also played a major role in 
spreading these claims.  Prior to the proliferation of social media and smart devices email 
forwards were widely used by conservatives to spread false claims and political rhetoric too 
extreme for mainstream media outlets (Hayes 2007). 
These range from creepy rage-filled quasi-fascist invocations (“The next time you see an 
adult talking…during the playing of the National Anthem–kick their ass”) to treacly 
aphorisms of patriotic/religious uplift (“remember only two defining forces have ever 
offered to die for you, Jesus Christ…and the American Soldier”). (Hayes 2007) 
 
Such emails act as an “informational staple” for the extreme right, who often dismiss mainstream 
media as a source of true and important information.  Hayes argues that “whisper campaigns” 
have been around for ages but the ease and anonymity of spreading misinformation via email has 
made these campaigns more effective. 
 Such emails were used by conspiracy theorists and the extreme right to spread falsehoods 
about Barack Obama in an attempt to discredit him and sow dissent about his eligibility to 
become a US President.  Such emails have even found their way into other media outlets 
claiming that Obama followed Wahhabism14 and that he joined a Christian church to aid his 
                                                
13 See Martin v. Lingle 
14 An extreme fundamentalist Islamic doctrine that labels all non-Wahhabi followers as 
apostates.  Apostasy is viewed by some fundamentalists as a justification to kill.  This doctrine 
has historically been at the core of Islamic terror organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
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candidacy for the Presidency (Hayes 2007).  Not only is this claim false, but its original author is 
unknown even though it was later published in an online magazine called Insight.  In addition to 
the emails, conservative blogs had begun to circulate falsehoods about Obama as well as 
Martin’s press release.  These blogs and social media groups later created and distributed false 
information about Obama in the same way that they still do today in regards to Hillary Clinton. 
The Pizzagate Affair 
 One of the more bizarre events influenced by the 2016 US Presidential Election was the 
debunked conspiracy theory known as Pizzagate.  Prior to the beginning of this conspiracy 
Clinton campaign manager John Podesta fell for a spearfishing15 attack, leading to the second 
substantial email leak of the 2016 election.  After WikiLeaks posted all of John Podesta’s emails 
on their site a conspiracy began to form on a Donald Trump forum on the site 4chan.  Users of 
the site were dissecting the emails looking for any dirt they could find on Hillary Clinton.  While 
doing so they read into an email conversation between the Podesta brothers about dinner plans at 
a Washington DC pizzeria.  Though this conversation was truly about pizza, the phrase “cheese 
pizza” is often used by pedophiles to refer to child pornography.  With that knowledge in hand 
conspiracy theorists on the forum began pouring over the emails for references to pizza, leading 
them to a mention of the pizzeria Comet Ping Pong.  As with all rumors of this sort, the 
speculation spiraled out of control and soon there were rumors circulating on social media that 
the Clinton campaign was linked to a pizzeria with “killrooms” and child sex slaves where 
cannibalism and Satanism were practiced.  On December 4th 2016, an enraged and armed Edgar 
                                                
15 Spearfishing is a type of social engineering exploit designed to target a specific person.  That 
person is then deceived by a fraudulent link designed to mimic a real site that the victim is likely 
to enter their login credentials.  In this case John Podesta received a fraudulent email claiming to 
be from Google.  He then clicked a linked that redirected him to a fake Google website where he 
entered his username and password. 
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Welch entered Comet Ping Pong, fired shots into the walls, and went in search of child slaves 
inside the pizzeria (Aisch et al 2016).  Welch came up empty handed and surrendered to the 
police (Kang and Goldman 2016).  After the Welch incident, the conspiracy continued and 
Mainstream media was blamed for hiding the truth about Hillary Clinton and Comet Ping Pong.  
Several false videos and fake news stories were circulated on social media pushing the Pizzagate 
conspiracy, citing benign emails as coded messages for sexual services and pedophilia.  Some 
stories also claimed that the sign on the pizzeria had satanic imagery and that the Podestas were 
kidnappers (Aisch et al 2016).  In addition to the continued fake news circulating around the 
incident a Louisiana man, Yusif Jones, had begun making death threats to the employees of the 
pizzeria 3 days after the Welch incident. 
Russian Influence on the 2016 Election 
 While the DNC hack and the alleged collusion between the Russian government and the 
Donald Trump campaign have been at the forefront of the investigations into Russian 
interference with the 2016 US Presidential Election, perhaps the most insidious method of 
Russian interference was its misinformation campaigns on Facebook and Twitter (Isaac and 
Shane 2017).  Russian intelligence agencies have historically used a series of active measures16 
such as dezinformatsiya17 and kompromat18 (Shelepin 1960, Andropov 1971, Mitrokhin 2007).   
"The use of cyber and social media has significantly increased the impact and the 
capabilities that — obviously this has been done for years and years, even decades," said 
Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats. "But the ability they have to use the 
                                                
16 “Active measures” is the English translation of the Russian term for KGB and FSB 
manipulation of international affairs for the interests of the Russian government.  The active 
measures toolkit ranges from informational attacks to assassinations for the intent of sowing 
discontent, mistrust, and manipulating foreign populations. 
17 Dezinformatsiya or disinformation, is a type of active measure that utilizes false information 
or propaganda to influence a population. 
18 Kompromat or compromising material, is an active measure utilizing embarrassing or 
otherwise compromising material to manipulate an individual towards a specific end. 
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interconnectedness [of the Internet] and all that provides ... they literally upped their 
game to the point where it's having a significant impact." (Ewing 2017) 
 
Whereas past attempts of spreading misinformation required leafleting and connections to 
mainstream news presses, the modern dezinformatsiya machine (social media) is a cheap, and 
effective tool where its users spread misinformation. This information can take a few forms, an 
advertisement, an article, or even a paid commenter or troll.  These misinformation pieces are 
often shared by users who do not question the validity of the claim. This is typically the case if it 
ideologically aligns with the user’s (mis)informational bubble, an informational space many 
social media users find themselves in when surrounded only with information they agree with 
(Bakshy et al 2015, Rutenberg 2017).  Such active measures campaigns have historically been 
used to so discontent and mistrust between allies or racial minorities and the government 
(Mitrokhin 2007, Ewing 2017).  While social media content was used as part of the multi-
pronged campaign to influence the 2016 Presidential Election, history suggests that this effect 
would be only a side effect of the Russian exacerbation of existing US socio-cultural divides.  
Such divides were ripe for exploitation due to the polarized extremist factions on the edges of the 
political spectrum that have risen out of social media (Sunstein 2009). 
 As of November 2017, Facebook has discovered approximately 470 accounts and over 
3,000 advertisements linked to the Russian government (Shane and Goel 2017, Shane and Isaac 
2017).  While most of the advertisements did not directly promote a Presidential candidate, they 
promoted divisive issues such as gun ownership and LGBTQ rights.  In addition to 
advertisements, the Russia linked accounts were used to create pages and groups on Facebook to 
enhance the distribution of material (Isaac and Shane 2017).  As a result, these messages are 
estimated to have been seen by 126 million Americans (Fowler 2017).  Despite this Facebook 
told Congress that the Russian operation was “fairly rudimentary” (Fowler 2017).  According to 
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Fowler the algorithms on Facebook did most of the leg work.  While effort went into the creation 
of these messages and advertisements, Russia was able to select who they wanted to target and 
Facebook did the work for them.  Using these targeted marketing tools, the Russia-linked 
Internet Research Agency was able to target several cultural groups in the US and polarize them.  
In addition, Russian messages were shared unknowingly by celebrities which accelerated the 
distribution of their content (Fowler 2016). 
Social Media as a Mobilizing Force 
Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville VA 
 The Unite the Right rally was an attempt to unite the various factions of the American 
extreme-right to protest the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee from the recently renamed 
Emancipation19 Park in Charlottesville Virginia (Fortin 2017).  The two-day event that took 
place in August 2017 was preceded by two smaller rallies, one organized by the white 
supremacist Richard Spencer and the other by the Ku Klux Klan (Lind 2017).  The rally was 
organized by white nationalist Jason Kessler after his attempts to stop the removal of the statue 
had failed.  On August 7th, less than a week from the date of the rally, the city rescinded the 
permit allowing the rally to occur at Emancipation Park (Graff 2017).   
Citing concerns about the estimated attendance of the event, city officials in 
Charlottesville wanted the rally to be moved to McIntire Park for alleged safety reasons.  
Specifically, city officials were concerned that the large estimated attendance of the event would 
be too large for the smaller Emancipation Park located in the downtown area, leading to the 
possibility of the protestors congregating in the streets around the park.  As a result, Kessler 
sought the help of the ACLU to sue the city of Charlottesville.  Since the city had changed the 
                                                
19 Emancipation Park was previously named Lee Park. 
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location on incredibly short notice while not altering any of the counter protests in the area, the 
judge suspected the location change was due to the nature of the protest, he filed an injunction in 
Kessler’s favor on August 11th (ACLU 2017) 
Unlike the previous protests in the months before the rally, the Unite the Right rally was 
intended to do as its name suggests in addition to protesting the statue removal.  Therefore, the 
rally’s attendance was an amalgamation of several white nationalist, white supremacist, and neo-
Nazi groups.  Thus, many of the leaders of these extreme-right factions were also in attendance 
such as, Richard Spencer20, Mike Enoch21, Nathan Damigo22, and David Duke23 (Fausset and 
Feuer 2017).  Except for Duke, these group leaders gained their followers through the internet 
and social media (Diep 2017 & O’Brien et al 2017).  In addition to these groups several armed 
militias also appeared at the rally to protest.  The most popular of these militias include the Oath 
Keepers24 and the 3 Percenters25 (WBUR 2017).  In opposition to the protestors, there were 
several left-leaning groups in attendance to protest the rally including Black Lives Matter, 
Redneck Revolt26, and Antifa27.  In total, it was estimated that approximately 500 protesters were 
in attendance and more than 1000 counter-protesters. 
                                                
20 Leader of the National Policy Institute, a white supremacist lobbying group. 
21 Founder of “The Right Stuff,” a white nationalist blog and “The Daily Shoah,” an anti-Semitic 
podcast. 
22 Founder of Identity Evropa, a white supremacist group. 
23 Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. 
24 Stewart Rhodes founded this organization in 2009 for current and former police and military to 
continue their oath to “defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic.” Oath 
Keepers in the police or military will disobey certain orders and the group often mobilizes to 
defend their interpretation of the constitution. 
25 Oath Keeper Mike Vanderboegh founded the 3 Percenters with the same mission statement as 
the Oath Keepers.  The primary difference between Oath Keepers and 3 Percenters is that the 3 
Percenters is primarily for civilians. 
26 An armed anti-racist and anti-fascist group 
27 A collective of groups that fight white supremacy and fascism. 
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 The rally was originally planned as a one day event to take place at Emancipation Park on 
August 12th however a pre-rally march took place the night before as well.  The march took place 
on the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville, consisting of approximately 100 
marchers (Lind 2017).  The protestors marched carrying lit tiki torches while chanting white 
supremacist and Nazi slogans and periodically performing the Nazi salute.  Meanwhile a 
peaceful counter-protest was in progress surrounding a statue of Thomas Jefferson.  The white 
supremacists then marched toward the protesters at the Jefferson statue and surrounded the 
protesters.  Soon after reportedly being attacked with pepper spray by the marchers, a counter-
protester used a “chemical spray” on the marchers and a brawl ensued (Lind 2017).  The event 
was later condemned by the mayor of Charlottesville and it increased tensions between protesters 
and counter-protesters the night before the rally. 
 The next day on August 12th protesters gathered early in McIntyre Park and chanted 
white supremacist and Nazi slogans while waving Confederate and Nazi flags, and Trump Pence 
campaign signs (Stolberg and Rosenthal 2017).  The park was then surrounded by chanting 
counter-protesters including clergy and Harvard professor Cornel West.  Despite the extremely 
polarized dynamic between protesters and counter-protesters, the event remained peaceful during 
the morning.  As the beginning of the rally drew closer, both sides moved to Emancipation Park 
for the 12:00pm event (Stolberg and Rosenthal 2017).  During this move taunting and fighting 
began and the arrests started to begin.   
Before the rally was even scheduled to begin, the entire event was plunged into chaos.  
Protesters and counter-protesters used pepper spray and clubs on each other and the gathering 
was declared unlawful by the police.  The sudden surge of violence prompted Charlottesville and 
the state of Virginia to each declare a state of emergency.  Soon after Virginia State Police with 
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the assistance of the National Guard dispersed the crowd and arrested those who refused to leave 
only minutes after the scheduled start time of the rally (Stolberg and Rosenthal 2017).  Nearly 
100 extreme-right protesters moved from Emancipation Park back to McIntyre Park to try to 
continue the botched rally. 
Finally, just before 2pm, as one group of counter-protesters was moving away from the 
event, Nazi sympathizer Alex Fields drove his car into the protesters, hit a parked car, then 
backed up through the protesters one more time as he fled injuring countless people and killing 
Heather Heyer (Stolberg and Rosenthal 2017 & Lopez 2017).  Meanwhile in an unrelated 
incident two hours later, a police helicopter monitoring the rally crashed killing two offers 
(Lopez 2017). Several officials, including Attorney General Jeff Sessions condemned the attack 
as an act of domestic terrorism. 
 While many government officials were quick to unequivocally condemn both the hate 
groups present at the rally and the violence they caused, President Trump took a more weak-
handed approach.  In his first statement on the event Trump stated, "we condemn in the strongest 
possible terms this egregious display of hatred, bigotry and violence on many sides, on many 
sides" (2017f).  While some protesters and counter-protesters were violent, Trump’s statement 
stands apart from similar statements since he did not denounce the white supremacists, many of 
which were wearing MAGA28 hats.  In addition, Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke 
tweeted, "Thank you President Trump for your honesty & courage to tell the truth about 
#Charlottesville & condemn the leftist terrorists in BLM/Antifa" (Cohen 2017).  President 
Trump received similar praise by other white supremacist leaders as well.  While this statement 
                                                
28 Red hats distributed by the Trump presidential campaign with the words “Make America Great 
Again” printed on them in white letters. 
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boded well with the extreme-right, it was largely condemned by the media and many Republican 
government officials. 
 President Trump made another statement of the issue two days later, on August 14th.  In 
this much less ambiguous statement Trump specifically condemned Nazism and white 
supremacy.  This time Trump said, “To anyone who acted criminally in this weekend's racist 
violence, you will be held fully accountable. Justice will be delivered. [...] Racism is evil. And 
those who cause violence in its name are criminals and thugs, including the K.K.K., neo-Nazis, 
white supremacists and other hate groups that are repugnant to everything we hold dear as 
Americans” (Thrush 2017).  The President was encouraged to make this statement by John Kelly 
despite believing that the first statement was sufficient (Lemire 2017).  The statement was 
criticized for coming too late, causing Trump to criticize the “bad people” of the “#Fake News 
Media” (Perkins 2017).  Trump had made two more statements on the event in which he pointed 
partial blame at an alleged “alt-left” and accused people who wanted confederate statues 
removed of “taking away our culture” (Krieg 2017).  These statements resulted in several 
resignations from the President’s advisory boards. 
 Meanwhile, in the social media world users sorted through the footage of the rally and the 
march the night before in order to publish their names.  This practice, known as doxxing, is a 
tool used to shame people on the internet.  It is controversial for many reasons, including its 
margin for error.  While many of the marchers’ identities were revealed to their families and 
coworkers, there was at least one case of mistaken identity (Victor 2017).  Kyle Quinn, an 
innocent engineering professor, was nowhere near Charlottesville during the rally.  He was 
however linked to the rally by a tweet with a picture of his face that was shared tens of thousands 
of times.  He also received numerous hate messages on the social media platform and users were 
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pressuring him to resign (Victor 2017).  Ultimately while doxxing people actually present at the 
rally resulted in some public shaming, it may not have had much of an impact.   
 One defining characteristic that separates the Charlottesville case from something like a 
clan rally was that no attempt was made by the protesters to conceal their identities (Thompson 
2017).  Instead Klansmen and white nationalists where shamelessly marching down the streets.  
Such a shift according to Richard Spencer is to normalize Nazi salutes and white nationalist 
ideology.  Spencer claimed that the time for secret identities is over and that he doesn’t see 
himself as a marginal figure that needs to hide from society, rather he sees himself as a 
mainstream figure (Thompson 2017).  By redefining the norms of society with white nationalism 
inside their bounds it is conceivable that the views of people like Richard Spencer will be 
legitimated by society.  In conjunction with Trump’s refusal to unambiguously speak out against 
white supremacists Thompson fears that America is inching in that direction (Thompson 2017). 
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Section 4: Findings and Discussion 
Findings 
Figure 1: Table of Key Information from Cases 
 Source/Organizer Year(s) 
Birther Case • Andy Martin (Origin) 
• Multiple Sources • 2004-2015 
Pizzagate Case • Multiple Sources • 2016 
2016 Election Case 
• IRA 
• FSB 
• Kremlin 
• 2016-2017 
Unite the Right Case • Jason Kessler • 2017 
 
 Form Audience 
Birther Case • Misinformation 
• Conspiracy Theory • American Voters 
Pizzagate Case • Conspiracy Theory • People Critical of Hillary Clinton 
2016 Election Case • Misinformation Campaign • American People/Voters 
Unite the Right Case • Protest Rally • Extreme Conservative Factions • People for Statue Removal 
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 Platform Effects and Outcomes 
Birther Case 
• Mass Media 
• Email Chains 
• Social Media 
• Failed to Discredit Barack Obama 
• Several Failed Lawsuits to Deny Obama 
the Presidency 
• Donald Trump Tried to Blame the 
Conspiracy on Hillary Clinton 
Pizzagate Case 
• 4chan 
• Reddit 
• Twitter 
• May Have Had an Influence on the 
Election 
• Armed Assault of a Pizza Restaurant 
• Death Treats 
2016 Election Case • Facebook 
• Twitter 
• Small Influence on Election 
• Exacerbated Polarization Based on 
Politics, Race, Etc. 
• Sow Discord 
Unite the Right Case 
• Facebook 
• Twitter 
• Event Speakers 
• Statue Removed 
• 3 Dead & Multiple Injured 
• Demonstrated Strength, Size, and 
Support of Movement 
• Shift from Anonymity to Pride in 
Identity/Affiliation (No KKK Hoods) 
 
Figure 2: Theory and Related Historical Event 
 
Theoretical	Concept	 Related	Historical	Event/Shift	
• Neoliberalism • Deregulation 
• Media	Events	&	Hyperreality			 • Return of Sensationalism in News & Post-Truth Era 
• Aesthetic Populism • Favoring Buzzfeed & Alt-Media Over Traditional News Sources 
• Echo Chambers  • Rise of Extremism in US Politics 
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Figure 3: Theory and Related Phenomena 
 
Theoretical	Concept	 Related Phenomena 
• Spectacle • Social Media 
• Surface Intensities  • Depthless Short-Term Outrage on Social Media 
• Informational	Cascades		 • Flooding	of	Social	Media	with	Information	(True	&	False)	on	a	Media	Event	
• Echo Chambers  • Reverberation of Ideology in Online Communities 
• Competing Knowledges  
• Dominant Discourse vs Contradictory 
Worldview i.e. Mostly Inclusive vs Racial 
Superiority 
• Imagined Communities  • Communities on Social Media That Bring Certain People Together 
• Media Events  • News Coverage of Each Event vs Facts 
• Hyperreality  • Fake News Stories That Seem More Real Than Fact 
• Mobilization • Facebook Event Feature Used for "Unite the Right 
 
 
Emergent Themes 
  
• Social Media as Key Tool 
• Cause or Effect of Polarization 
• Discord 
• Conspiracies 
• Misinformation 
• Social Media Effects Real World  
 
After rigorous coding of each of the four events under analysis, some trends and 
emergent themes appeared in the data. Beyond the obvious that social media has played a crucial 
role in each of these cases, there are some variations in how it was used in some cases.  All three 
fake news cases shared the common intention of discrediting political candidates.  While one of 
these cases was an organized campaign by a foreign government, the other two fake news cases 
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lacked the same type of coordination and took the form of conspiracy theories.  The Birther 
conspiracy continuously made the news for nine years and was perpetuated by prominent 
conservatives, particularly Donald Trump.  Conversely, the Pizzagate conspiracy was short-lived 
and did not share the same sort of popularity until the shooting.  Following the incident at Comet 
Ping-Pong the event quickly faded away.   
Of the three fake news cases, the Russian election interference stood out from the others 
as it was one part of a much larger campaign to influence the 2016 Presidential election.29  
Ironically the content released in this campaign was much subtler than the outrageous claims of 
the other cases.  Rather than trying to convince Americans to buy into a scandal, Russian 
dezinformatsiya insidiously polarized American social media users by playing into their existing 
fears and points of contention.  While the Birther case was similar in the sense that it aimed to 
portray an American political candidate as a religious extremist to feed into post-9/11 fears, it 
was still an outrageous claim to begin with.  As evidenced in the images in this section, the 
Russian campaign was not making outlandish false claims but rather, false claims that seem real 
because they play into the fears of a particular group.  
 Lastly the alt-right Unite the Right rally stands apart from the other cases for a few 
reasons.  Unlike the other cases, the rally was a physical event.  It was organized on social media 
by an alt-right blogger and sever other prominent alt-right figures were scheduled to speak there.  
Rather than being a cause of polarization, it was a product of extreme political polarization.  
Furthermore, the rally was designed to unite the various extreme conservative factions and 
spread a different message than past rallies.  Unite the Right and its aftermath not only showed 
                                                
29 The Russian interference campaign also relied on hacking the DNC and allegedly colluding 
with the Trump campaign.  The Pizzagate case stems directly from John Podesta’s that were 
emails made public due to the Russian DNC hack. 
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that extremists can utilize social media to mobilize in large numbers, but it also demonstrated 
that the extreme right has the support of many more people than in the past. This unique incident 
was not condemned by President Trump.  Despite its ultimate failure to save the statue of Robert 
E Lee, the rally was successful in pushing the extreme right into the mainstream.  Most of all, as 
the images below depict, the rally demonstrated that racist and xenophobic groups are thriving 
and violent. 
Images 
 
 
Figure 1 Donald Trump, a large proponent of the Birther conspiracy, using 
Twitter to spread misinformation 
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Figure 2 One of the thousands of Russian Facebook posts designed to polarize Americans and sow discord 
 
Figure 3 Two prominent Alt-Right members Tweeting about the Pizzagate Conspiracy 
 
Figure 4 White supremacists with tiki torches surrounding counter-protestors around the Thomas Jefferson statue at 
the University of Virginia in Charlottesville 
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Figure 5 Nazi sympathizer Alex Fields driving his car into counter-protesters, killing Heather Heyer 
 
Discussion 
How Fake News Becomes Real 
 In response to the misuse of their platform to spread propaganda and disinformation, 
Facebook announced in December 2016 that it would work with 3rd party sources to verify 
disputed information and claims in articles distributed on the platform (Levin 2017).  However, 
many of these fact-checkers have voiced significant doubts in the success of this initiative as it 
approaches the one year mark .  In addition, Facebook has continually refused to release any data 
showing the success of their efforts (Levin 2017).  Furthermore, many of the fact-checkers hired 
by Facebook are journalists often work for news organizations that distribute articles on 
Facebook.  This creates an obvious conflict of interest when screening articles with questionable 
validity (Levin 2017).  While it may seem unimportant to put such an emphasis on verifying 
content on social media platforms, they are in fact significant information sources.  Depending 
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on the age, 39 to 61 percent of social media users get political and government news on 
Facebook (Mitchell et al 2015).  Respondents to the survey were broken up into generations30 
and 39% of Baby Boomers, 51% of Gen Xers, and 61% of Millennials get their news from 
Facebook.  Ultimately, if a sizable proportion of the population is getting its news from a media 
platform with questionable credibility, then many Americans have been unknowing reading fake 
news.  
While the wide-spread proliferation of fake news articles on social media platforms like 
Facebook is inherently problematic, it is not the sole reason that events like the Birther 
Movement or Pizzagate occurred.  
“The more America becomes divided along its multiple axes of social difference, of 
which race, ethnicity, gender, class, and age are only some of the most salient, the more 
frequently media events and figures that dramatize these fault lines will occur, the more 
intensely they will grab the American imagination, and the more bitter will be the 
struggles to inflect them in one direction or another.” (Fiske and Hancock 2016, p291) 
 
Due to the ongoing active measures implemented by Russia, these axes of social difference have 
been amplified and tensions are higher than usual.  In a deeply polarized and conflicted society, 
media events can have dramatic effects.  These events that in one sense bring people together 
(since media events by nature are experienced by everyone), also act to divide people based on 
an individual’s identity or placement in society. 
During these media events, “all media commentators present their view of events as 
truth” (Fiske and Glynn 1995, p516).  In the Pizzagate and Birther cases, conservative alternative 
media was manufacturing conspiracy theories that were eventually discredited.  These cases had 
no basis in reality but became true when the evidence was fabricated to validate them.  Much like 
                                                
30 Three generations were defined in the study. Respondents born between 1946 and 1964 were 
defined as “Baby Boomers,” those born between 1965 and 1980 were defined as “Generation X” 
and those born between 1981 and 1996 were defined as “Millennials.” 
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Fiske and Glynn’s example of Rush Limbaugh creating the footage he needed to push a 
narrative, these cases were evidenced by vague questionable proofs.  However, in the dubious 
counter history pushed by the extreme-right about liberal conspiracies and government deceit, 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were believed to be guilty before the “proof” was ever found.  
Therefore, using questionable evidence and dubious claims to validate existing feelings of 
mistrust in these people was not difficult for those that believed these conspiracies. 
It is crucial to recognize that the multitude of social media users that believed Russian 
disinformation, did not intentionally deceive themselves. As no person will ever meet every 
citizen of a nation or physically bear witness to every event as it occurs, our understanding of the 
world at large relies on second-hand accounts.  These accounts typically come from news media 
and social media.  Both social media and news media (alternative & mainstream) are largely 
mediated by images.  In many ways, our understanding of these images is our understanding of 
the world.   
[I]mages produce a more urgent reality than events themselves.  Images which once stood 
in for a reality outside themselves, now increasingly displace that reality altogether. 
(Fiske and Glynn 1995, 507) 
 
Due to technological limitations, images in early newspapers were incredibly limited, now 
modern news media primarily consists of videos and images.  These images are often captioned 
or framed in different ways to portray different views on what occurred.  Therefore, “reality is 
always amenable to reconfiguration through the process of simulation” (Fiske and Glynn 1995, 
512).  This is inherently problematic as the same tools by which the connected world gains 
knowledge of itself can be used to intentionally deceive it.  This was evident in the Russia case 
and by Andy Martin in the Birther case.  
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 All three cases are similar in the sense that fictitious information was spread 
unknowingly after its original conception.  In contrast, the Pizzagate case stands out from the 
other two since the original false information wasn’t intentionally created to deceive.  Rather 
Pizzagate is the product of the inability to distinguish reality from a simulation that seemed more 
realistic than reality.  Specifically, the 4chan users that were trying to decode John Podesta’s 
emails believed so strongly that Hillary Clinton was a criminal they unknowingly created a 
simulation to support this belief.  At that moment, the “decoded” pizza messages were more real 
than anything the media or government would tell them.  This pursuit of the hyperreal and the 
subsequent distribution of the simulated messages had caused a ripple effect, drawing in many 
others, including Edgar Welch and Yusif Jones.  A similar effect happened in the Birther case 
after Andy Martin knowingly set it into motion.  In that case deeply held xenophobic beliefs 
made the idea of Barack Obama being a Muslim born elsewhere would have undoubtedly 
seemed more real than the truth that he is a Christian born in Hawai’i. 
According to Baudrillard, society lost its ability to determine images from the reality they 
originated from. 
Thus information dissolves meaning and the social into a sort of nebulous state leading 
not at all to a surfeit of innovation but to the very contrary, to total entropy. (Baudrillard 
1983 p100) 
 
Baudrillard argued that we have transitioned into a postmodern society where we are bombarded 
with images.  Moreover, this bombardment provides information at the cost of transitioning the 
social into silent masses.  Ultimately reality and simulation become nebulous and 
indistinguishable.  This means that reality is indistinguishable from simulation, and the hierarchy 
of reality over simulation is no longer relevant.  Without the boundaries of reality, truth is 
individualized and amounts simply to belief rather than the pursuit of an absolute concept. 
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Communities of Hate 
 
 In the wake of the rally in Charlottesville and the growing extremist movements in the 
United States and Europe it is important to understand how these movements have spread.  For 
years, American society has pushed extreme ideology and overt white supremacy toward the 
fringes of society.  Public condemnation of neo-Nazis and the KKK has been an effective 
method for decades for keeping people sympathetic to white supremacist ideology from finding 
like-minded people since revealing those sympathies was dangerous.  However, the internet and 
social media perform three distinct functions to help white supremacists meet and spread their 
ideology.   
First, social media brings people together.  Due to the large membership of these 
platforms and the anonymity they can offer to the savvy user, members of the alt-right and white 
supremacists can seek each other out by joining groups31.  These groups often forge imagined 
communities where otherwise isolated users can become connected and share information.  In 
isolation, these groups become ideological echo chambers that amplify extreme ideas with no 
dissenting opinions.  Furthermore, the group, often hidden from other users, provides a “safe 
space” for extreme ideas to be shared without consequence.   
The second function social media serves for the extreme right is its ability to act as a 
power tool to disseminate information.  Particularly Twitter has proven useful as a means to 
anonymously share and receive information.  Since 2012 the following of American white 
nationalist groups on Twitter has increased six-fold (O’Brien 2017).  This is particularly 
dangerous as there is a great deal of anonymity and ease in indoctrinating people though social 
                                                
31 While this section describes the extreme right in US politics, similar communities exist for 
people on the extreme left. 
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media (O’Brien 2017).  Twitter has been extensively used by the US extremists and alt-right as 
well as other extremist groups such as ISIS to recruit followers and disseminate messages.  In 
addition to Twitter there are several blog sites and chat rooms used to recruit followers that can 
be found in complete anonymity.  Therefore, public condemnation is no longer a problem to 
potential white supremacists or neo-Nazis and they can actively seek out information and hate-
friendly internet spaces with relative ease (O’Brien 2017).   
 The third function social media serves for extremists is to organize events.  Before it was 
abruptly removed from Facebook the Unite the Right rally was using a Facebook event page to 
mobilize the various factions of the extreme-right (Heath 2017).  Furthermore, many of the lead 
figures in these groups have massive social media followings that they used without cost or any 
real effort to spread information about the event to thousands of people.  The same method was 
also used for the counter-mobilization to the event.  Ultimately social media provide the means 
for fringe movements once deemed as deviant to push themselves into the mainstream with little 
effort.  As a result, the public must figure out how to deal with extremists while they are present 
at hand since they can mobilize easily anywhere with devastating effects. 
What Could Have Been Done Differently? 
While many have called for censorship of extreme-right content from social media, such 
a seemingly simple solution would be misguided.  Extreme-right rhetoric and hate speech are 
unfortunately not mutually exclusive, however it is imperative to tread carefully when censoring 
political speech that does not include hate speech.  Such actions would only further catalyze the 
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exodus of extreme-right leaning people from Leftbook32 to other social media platforms33 where 
they would become further ideologically isolated and polarized.  Despite this sounding like a 
win-win situation on the surface, pushing white supremacists into the fringes of society rather 
than confronting their ideas will not make the problem go away.  In fact, the literature presented 
in the theory section explains the role of isolation, both spatially and ideologically, in creating 
polarized groups.   
Despite all the problems that can rise out of social media, it is not intrinsically bad.  It 
cannot create white supremacists or social justice warriors; it only catalyzes these outcomes.  
The polarization and political extremeness that flows through social media is magnified by 
algorithms designed to connect people to a product, people who may know each other, content a 
user might like, or users to likeminded users and groups.  In this sense, it is a neutral but 
powerful connecting force.  However, this process could also be inverted to expose users to 
ideas, viewpoints, and people that the user would not intentionally seek out.  A socially 
conscious platform could intentionally expose its users to opposing viewpoints and new ideas.  It 
could also aim to algorithmically isolate extremely political people from similar individuals 
rather than coalescing them together.  In addition, further measures need to be taken to 
distinguish objective news media from opinionated news and blogs.  The current model for 
screening fake news has proven ineffective and is fraught with conflicts of interest (Levin 2017).  
Ultimately, some of these measures are counterintuitive the current nature of social media, 
                                                
32 A slang term to refer to Facebook used by conservatives that believe Facebook is politically 
biased against conservatives. 
33 Alternative platforms like Gab.ai have become havens for uncensored extreme-right rhetoric 
and hate speech. 
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however they are viable and easy to implement.  Then with these measures in place, social media 
can do what it was designed to do, to bring people together. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 While there are definite advantages to qualitative research such as increased depth and 
nuance, there are also limitations to this type of research.  The most obvious of these limitations 
lie within the sampling process and low sample size.  Whereas more positivistic methods would 
strive to remove the selection bias of the researcher, this project sought to explain larger 
phenomena utilizing carefully chosen samples to best illustrate these phenomena.  Furthermore, 
with the unit of analysis being each event, there are only four samples.  Lastly, the media bias 
within the articles selected to construct the event catalogs used for the analysis was carefully 
addressed but possibly not entirely avoided.  While this research utilized archival records 
whenever possible, future research could look to these sources exclusively34.  Despite these 
limitations, the research provided rich data and context on a some multifaceted and increasingly 
popular phenomena.  Future research would attempt to close the gaps presented in this section by 
enriching this research a quantitative element.  One possible direction would involve a secondary 
analysis of ANES data map changes in political extremism and media use on a larger scale over 
time. Such research was not included in this thesis as large longitudinal data sets like GSS and 
ANES have only begun to include variables regarding social media in the last year and the 
sample sizes of people who self-identify as politically extreme are very small, making analysis 
difficult. 
 
                                                
34 Such records were not available for all cases. 
 72 
 
Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated how social media have been utilized to disseminate false 
information and mobilize previously unpopular extremist movements in the US.  Building upon 
the works of Baudrillard, Anderson, Debord and others, this work demonstrated a shift in how 
Americans consume news media and the role political discourses in news and social media.  This 
shift in consumption dovetails with new dissemination technologies and deregulation by the 
FCC.  The historical section of this thesis begins and ends with a largely deregulated news media 
with lax professional norms, and in both the mid 1800s and in 2018 political commentary took 
precedent over objectivity and political fairness in the news.   
However, this does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship as several news 
organizations still follow strict professional norms.  Rather, this work argues the shift is due to 
the existing polarization in American culture in conjunction with new technologies that 
ideologically confine and connect users to like-minded people and ideas.  In this way, social 
media nurture extremism by creating communities that would otherwise be fractured by societal 
norms and by presenting or withholding information in a manner consistent with the beliefs of 
that community.  The information presented does not need to align with the popular discourse or 
truth, rather it only needs to align with the existing beliefs of the community.  Additionally, 
social media provides a unique and powerful toolkit to mobilize people to take political action.   
Previous works have illuminated how social media have politically influenced people 
with “ideological echo chambers.” However, this thesis goes further and demonstrates how 
social media in conjunction with alternative media have created competing knowledges defined 
by political discourses that now routinely conflict in profound ways. These clashes are not 
confined to social media and often manifest physically and are occasionally violent.
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